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ABSTRACT 
PETTERI VISTIAHO: Maritime Cyber Security Incident Data Reporting for Au-
tonomous Ships 
Tampere University of Technology 
Master of Science Thesis, 51 pages, 8 Appendix pages 
March 2018 
Master’s Degree Program in Information Technology 
Major: Communication Systems and Networks 
Examiner: Marko Helenius, Bilhanan Silverajan 
 
Keywords: autonomous shipping, cyber security, data modeling, IODEF, inci-
dent reporting  
The main research objective of this thesis was to find a suitable data model to be used 
for incident reporting purposes in the use case of autonomous shipping. To reach this 
objective, some research into the maritime industry, autonomous shipping, and incident 
management and reporting was needed. Research into these topics was conducted via a 
literature review.  
After these topics were investigated, some current incident data modeling and sharing 
methods were researched. Out of these IODEF seemed like the most suitable one for our 
use case, so it was chosen for further inspection. The IODEF specification was looked 
into more closely and a conclusion was ultimately made that the IODEF data model is 
suitable for reporting incident data from autonomous ships to the shore control center. 
However, the model was still missing some key information needed for this use case, so 
an extension for the data model was designed. 
The data model and extension were then put to test via different use scenarios to test 
applicability for the needs of autonomous shipping. From these use scenarios it was 
inferred that the model is applicable for the many different incident data reporting needs 
of autonomous shipping. Further analysis and testing was then conducted, including a 
transport test over cellular and satellite connections. The test and analysis further vali-
dated the use of the data model.  
All in all, the research was a success and a good data model was found for reporting 
incidents from autonomous ships. The work with the data model will continue further 
outside this thesis.  
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Tämän diplomityön tärkein tutkimustavoite oli löytää sopiva datamalli käytettäväksi 
ongelmatapausten raportoimiseksi autonomisen laivankuljetuksen tapauksessa. Tähän 
tavoitteeseen pääsemiseksi tarvittiin tutkimusta aiheista kuten merenkulkuteollisuus, 
autonominen laivankuljetus ja ongelmatapausten hallinta ja raportointi. Näitä aiheita 
tutkittiin kirjallisuuskatsauksen keinoin. 
Kun näihin aiheisiin oltiin tutustuttu, alettiin tutkia nykyisin käytössä olevia 
ongelmatapausten datan mallinnus- ja jakamismenetelmiä. Näistä IODEF vaikutti heti 
sopivimmalta työn käyttötapaukseen ja se valittiin tarkemmin tutkittavaksi. IODEF:n 
spesifikaatiodokumentteihin tutustuttiin tarkemmin ja päädyttiin siihen tulokseen, että 
IODEF:n datamalli on sopiva käytettäväksi ongelmatapausten datan raportointiin 
autonomiselta laivalta rannalla sijaitsevaan hallintakeskukseen. Datamallista puuttui 
kuitenkin vielä joitain tämän käyttötapauksen vaatimia tärkeitä tietoja, joten datamallille 
suunniteltiin laajennus. 
Tämän jälkeen datamalli ja siihen suunniteltu laajennus pääsivät testattaviksi erilaisissa 
käyttöskenaarioissa, jotta mallin soveltuvuutta autonomisen laivankuljetuksen tarpeisiin 
voitiin testata. Näistä käyttöskenaariotesteistä saatiin selville, että tämä datamalli pystyy 
täyttämään autonomisen laivankuljetuksen monet erilaiset ongelmatapausten datan 
raportointitarpeet. Tämän jälkeen mallille suoritettiin lisäanalyysia ja -testausta, muun 
muassa siirtotestit matkapuhelinverkon ja satelliittiyhteyden tapauksissa. Tämä analyysi 
ja testit vahvistivat edelleen uskoa datamallin sopivuudesta tähän käyttötarkoitukseen. 
Kaiken kaikkiaan tämä tutkimus onnistui erittäin hyvin ja hyvä datamalli 
ongelmatapausten raportoimiseksi autonomisilta laivoita löydettiin. Työtä tämän 
datamallin kanssa tullaan jatkamaan myös tämän diplomityön ulkopuolella. 
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Autonomous shipping The act of transporting cargo overseas via an autonomous 
vessel. The autonomous shipping chain includes ground 
transport to the ports, cargo handling at ports as well as 
transport overseas. The goal of autonomous shipping is to 
minimize the human input required to ship items. 
Autonomous vessel A ship that is unmanned and mostly self-navigating. It re-
ceives major navigation decisions through a satellite data 
link from a crew ashore if needed but can do navigational 
decisions itself by analyzing sensor and GPS data in a nor-
mal situation. 
Cyber security Protection of computer hardware and software assets, and 
data. It also aims to prevent any disruptions to the services 
these systems provide. 
Incident data reporting The act of reporting incident related data to the organiza-
tion’s CSIRT so that the incident can be resolved. 
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Incident data sharing The act of sharing incident related data between organiza-
tions to improve cyber security. 
Incident response A term that describes the way an organization handles the 
aftermath of a security breach or cyberattack. The goal of in-
cident response is to minimize the damage and downtime of 
the affected systems as well as to keep the costs caused by 
the incident at a minimum. Having a clear incident response 
plan helps organizations deal with incidents. 
Maritime cyber security A relatively new branch of cyber security that focuses on 
preventing cyberattacks targeted at the systems aboard ves-
sels and the maritime control systems. 
Security incident An event that disrupts normal operations. It may indicate that 
an organization’s network, system or data have been com-
promised or that a protective measure set in place to protect 
these has failed. 
Security threat A potential cause of an incident that might exploit a vulnera-
bility to breach security and cause harm to systems and or-
ganizations. 
Vulnerability A weakness or flaw in the design, implementation or opera-
tion of a system that an attacker can exploit to reduce the 
system’s information assurance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The maritime industry will be facing a huge change in the coming years as autonomous 
vessels become more commonplace. It is expected that fully autonomous ships, tugs, 
and ferries will be in use in some capacity by the year 2025. The first autonomous ves-
sels will operate in small restricted areas, like ports or rivers, and later we will see au-
tonomous ships on the open sea as well. [1]  
An autonomous vessel is a ship that is usually unmanned and mostly self-navigating. It 
receives major navigational decisions through a satellite data link from a crew ashore, if 
needed, but can also make navigational decisions by itself by analyzing sensor and 
Global Positioning System (GPS) data in a normal situation. These vessels will be used 
for all kinds of tasks, including cargo shipping, ferrying cars and people across rivers, 
and tugging larger ships in harbors. 
The use of autonomous ships will reduce the need for on-board crews, but it will create 
jobs on shore as people are needed to monitor and operate the vessels from control cen-
ters. These kinds of jobs are considerably more attractive for the young population than 
being stuck at sea for months at a time. Autonomous vessels are not going to remove the 
need for seafaring experts, they are just going to move the jobs to a more convenient 
location. 
Most of the technology needed to build and operate these vessels is already there. Tech-
nologies related to autonomous ships are being tested in a designated test area in Nor-
way right now [2]. A globally available test area for autonomous vessels, named 
Jaakonmeri Test Area, will be opened in late 2017 on the west coast of Finland [3]. 
There companies will be able to test their technologies related to autonomous maritime 
trafficking in open sea conditions, as well as icy conditions during the winter. For now, 
it is only possible to operate autonomous vessels inside the designated test areas, be-
cause of regulatory and legal problems. 
The first autonomous cargo ship in the world is expected to be the Norwegian YARA 
Birkeland [2]. This ship is expected to start operating as a manned vessel by the year 
2018, start remote operation in 2019 and then shift to fully autonomous operations in 
2020. Remote controlled vessels are operated from the shore via a satellite link, whereas 
automated ships are automatically operated by technology [4]. Autonomous vessels are 
a mix between these two. The differences between these ship operating schemes are 
shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Different ship operation schemes. [4] 
The introduction of autonomous ships will bring challenges for maritime cyber security 
as the satellite data links will be used more frequently and for more essential tasks than 
ever before. All kinds of data and instructions will be flowing back and forth through 
the satellite data link. This connection needs to be secured somehow, and what if some-
thing goes wrong? If a cyber security incident, or even a physical security one, is de-
tected, what actions need to be taken and what kind of messages need to be sent and 
where? 
Autonomous vessels can face all kinds of security threats at sea and at port. Cyber secu-
rity threats include hacking into any of the equipment of the ship or the data link, GPS 
spoofing, malware, and many more. Physical security threats can include extremist or 
state-sponsored attacks towards the vessel, theft of cargo, and piracy. Cyber and physi-
cal security threats often go hand-in-hand as cyber threats can be used to gain physical 
access to the vessel or its cargo. 
It is common practice to do predetermined actions when something goes wrong, this is 
called incident management. As autonomous shipping is a totally new area, it does not 
have common incident management and reporting practices set in place just yet. There-
fore, it is important to research into these areas and come up with new industry stand-
ards for managing and reporting incidents regarding autonomous shipping. 
Especially incident reporting faces new challenges with autonomous shipping. Firstly, it 
is hard to know if an incident has really happened or if we have a false positive, as no 
one is on board the ship. Secondly, the connectivity at sea can be problematic at times 
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and will make incident reporting harder. Lastly, knowing the information we need for a 
report and who to send the report to is not as straightforward as in traditional cases. 
This thesis describes a data reporting model for cases when a security incident has been 
detected onboard an autonomous ship. The model describes the information that needs 
to be sent and the structure for the information. It is also explored where these messages 
need to be sent and what additional measures need to be taken when an incident has 
been detected. 
1.1 Research Questions 
This thesis has four distinct research questions: 
1. What is the current state of autonomous shipping? 
2. What is the current state of maritime physical and cyber security? 
3. What are the common practices of incident management and reporting, and what 
kind of reporting methods are used currently? 
4. What kind of a cyber security incident data reporting model would be the best 
for autonomous ships? 
The fourth research question is the most important for the thesis. The rest of the ques-
tions need to be answered for background information and a basis on which a good an-
swer for question 4 can be built upon. 
1.2 Scope 
The scope for research question 1 is set to explaining what autonomous shipping is and 
what challenges it may face in the future. Some current autonomous shipping concepts 
are also looked at and compared. 
The scope for research question 2 is set to cover the current state and practices of mari-
time cyber and physical security as well as some security concerns directly related to 
autonomous shipping. The focus is on cyber security, and physical security is mainly 
just there as a side note. 
The scope for research question 3 is set to shortly explaining the common practices of 
incident management and reporting and to introducing some currently used incident 
reporting methods. The focus is on the beginning of the incident management chain, 
from incident discovery, data collection, and incident reporting, to incident validation. 
The scope for the incident data reporting model is set to include cases of cyber security 
incidents happening on a single autonomous ship, not a fleet of ships for example. The 
model focuses on transporting data between the ship and the command center. This 
doesn’t, however, mean that other uses for the model would completely be ignored. 
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1.3 Methodology 
This thesis work has two main purposes: to give a literature review of maritime cyber 
and physical security, autonomous shipping, and incident management and reporting, 
and to design an incident data reporting model for autonomous shipping. 
The literature review was done by researching papers, articles and news about these 
areas. The research was conducted mainly using the Tampere University of Technology 
(TUT) library’s academic search engine Andor and Google Scholar. Google search en-
gine was used in some cases to find specific Requests for Comments (RFC), news arti-
cles, and other publicly available documents. Here are the various search phrases that 
were used for the searches: 
• Maritime industry in the Nordics 
• Autonomous ship/shipping 
• Autonomous vessel 
• Autonomous vehicle 
• Maritime security 
• Maritime safety 
• Maritime cyber security 
• Maritime cyber security incident 
• Incident management 
• Incident reporting 
• Incident sharing 
• Incident data model/modeling 
All the found documents were carefully examined and the best ones for this thesis’ pur-
poses were selected and used as references when writing the theory part of the thesis. 
The incident data reporting model design was done through researching existing models 
and finding out whether they would be usable for this use case or not. A suitable data 
model was ultimately found and an extension for it was created to cater for the needs of 
this use case. Then the model’s applicability was tested through different use scenarios. 
Some analysis and testing were also made to further validate the use of the data model. 
Some inspiration for the structure of the thesis was drawn from various master’s theses 
found in the TUT library. 
1.4 Structure 
This thesis consists of four major parts which are introduction, theory, model design, 
and model testing. Each part serves its own purpose, but they also fulfil each other to 
form a cohesive structure. 
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The introduction part introduces the topic and thesis to the reader. Its purpose is to get 
the reader interested and prepared for the information to come. The introduction part is 
the first chapter of the thesis. 
The theory part consists of Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 is mostly about the maritime 
industry. A short description of maritime industry in the Nordic countries is given. In 
Chapter 2.1 autonomous shipping is explained and a model ship and its equipment are 
introduced. Some different concepts of autonomy are introduced and compared. Possi-
ble problems that autonomous shipping and ships will face are explained. In Chapter 
2.2, the current state of maritime cyber security is described. Common maritime physi-
cal and cyber security practices are introduced and reflected on autonomous shipping. 
Some example maritime cyber security incidents from around the world are introduced. 
In the third chapter, incident management and reporting are shortly explained, and the 
common practices of incident reporting are introduced in Chapter 3.1. Data modeling is 
then explained in Chapter 3.2 and some current incident data models are previewed in 
Chapter 3.3. The purpose of the theory part is to give the reader interesting and useful 
information about the topics of the thesis and to prepare the reader for the later chapters.   
The fourth chapter, which is the model design part, explains why the Incident Object 
Description Exchange Format (IODEF) data model was chosen for this use case. A 
thorough look into the specification document of the IODEF data model is given in 
Chapter 4.1. After the specification is examined, it is noticed that an extension is needed 
for the data model to be usable for our use case. This extension is then designed and 
explained in Chapter 4.2. 
The fifth and sixth chapters are the model testing part of the thesis. In this part, the cho-
sen data model and the designed extension are put into use through various use scenari-
os to determine the applicability of this data model for our use case. Full IODEF-
Documents in eXtensible Markup Language (XML) for the incident reports related to 
these scenarios are given in the appendices. Transport tests are conducted with these 
XML files and the model is further analyzed to validate the use of this data model for 
our use case. 
The seventh chapter of this thesis is there to draw conclusions about the thesis work. All 
the research questions are given answers here. The goal of this chapter is to draw the 
thesis together and make it whole. 
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2. THE MARITIME INDUSTRY 
The Nordic countries - Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland - have a strong 
tradition in the maritime industry, and shipping and shipbuilding are both still big con-
tributors to their economies. All the Nordic countries have large fleets of ships that are 
operated under their flags. These fleets contain many new ships, which shows that the 
maritime industry in the Nordic countries is still going strong. Even though a lot of the 
shipbuilding industry has been relocated to Asia in the recent years, many ships are still 
designed, and shipbuilding innovations are made in the Nordic countries. [5] 
The volume of maritime transportation is increasing rapidly all around the world. Re-
cently, Asian and South American countries have risen as the leaders of the maritime 
industry in terms of employment and fleet sizes. This, however, doesn’t mean that the 
Nordic countries would have been losing by any means, this only means that the growth 
has been faster elsewhere. The maritime industry, including shipping, shipbuilding, car-
go handling at ports, design, and research, still employs many people in the Nordic 
countries. [6] 
In the future, the Nordic maritime industry will likely have a leading role in the innova-
tion of advanced digital maritime solutions. As the examples presented in the introduc-
tion of world’s first autonomous ship testing areas in Norway and Finland show, the 
industry is already taking the first steps in becoming the world leader in innovation. At 
the heart of these new innovations are the sharing of information, seamless connectivity 
between assets and teams at sea and on shore, and collaborative technological solutions. 
[7] 
This growing focus on information and connectivity will bring new challenges for the 
maritime cyber security sector. Maritime cyber security is a relatively new branch of 
cyber security and new challenges and problems are faced every day in the field. As the 
Nordics, and the whole world in general, are so dependent on the maritime transport of 
goods and passengers, maritime cyber security is becoming a critical field of study and 
work. Making all the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems more 
cyber secure and resilient is a key challenge for the maritime industry. [8] 
The current state of affairs regarding maritime cyber security is relatively bad. The mar-
itime industry lacks a standardized approach to cyber security and the rates of cyberat-
tacks against the industry are increasing. Cyberattacks targeted at key ports could poten-
tially have disastrous consequences on a global scale. Hence a global approach to cyber 
security in the maritime sector is needed but will take time to implement. It would be in 
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the interest of everyone that the industry would come together and coalesce around a set 
of voluntary guidelines to improve cyber resilience. [9] 
2.1 Autonomous Shipping 
According to the Rolls-Royce director of digital and systems Asbjørn Skaro, autono-
mous cargo ships will be a common sight at the high seas by 2030. For this to become 
reality, many things need to happen. These include economic viability, regulation 
changes, and the right combination and integration of technology. [2] 
The idea of autonomous shipping is not a new one. Autonomous vessels have been de-
veloped, tested and researched since the 1970’s. Many small autonomous or radio-
controlled vessels are in use in research, coast guard, and military applications. It is ap-
parent that huge autonomous cargo ships will be built at some point, and it seems that 
the time is now. Many research, and development projects are ongoing in this field right 
now. [10] 
The removal of the human element is seen as the biggest benefit of autonomous ship-
ping as human errors will be less likely, crew costs are decreased, and no crew accom-
modations are needed onboard ships. It is said that nearly 80% of marine accidents are 
at least in part caused by human error. Autonomous ships will make human error less 
likely, but it is important to remember that the human factor will still be present in au-
tonomous ships, in different forms. The ship is of course built by humans and the algo-
rithms and rules of the internal decision-making logic have been designed and coded by 
humans who make errors. The human element is also present in the shore control cen-
ters. [10] 
It is also feared that removal of the human element could be a bad thing. Humans are 
flexible, creative, and able to adapt to surprising situations, which should have a posi-
tive impact on the safety of the system they operate. Surprising situations are a problem 
as it is impossible to teach a machine to react to every possible scenario in the correct 
manner. Therefore keeping at least some of the human element for example via the 
shore control center is important for the future of autonomous shipping. [10] 
2.1.1 Different Concepts of Autonomy 
There are different concepts of semi-autonomous operations that the ships will probably 
go through before reaching full autonomy. Here are a few concepts that can become a 
reality. 
Collecting and analyzing real time sensor data with the objective of predicting the func-
tion performance and future risk of malfunction is called monitoring the health of func-
tions. This is a predictive system and is important for the safety of the vessel and know-
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ing when a proactive maintenance is needed. These kinds of decision support systems 
are seen as some kind of autonomy or automation and are already in wide use in the 
industry. [11] 
In the case of fleets of ships, the master-slave concept should be a useful one. This 
means that there is one normal manned ship that leads the fleet and the rest of the ships 
are slaves that follow the master ship. The other ships are autonomous to a decree and 
are fully unmanned. The operations of these ships are monitored and controlled from 
the master ship by a team of skilled seafarers who also have competence in autonomous 
technology. [11] 
In the captain-on-land concept, the ship is monitored and controlled by a shore control 
center. In this concept, the ship still lacks autonomy and is mostly controlled from the 
shore. This could be a stepping stone towards autonomous operations. [11] 
Coming years will show which way the evolution of autonomous ships will take. A ful-
ly autonomous ship would still need to be monitored from somewhere in case some-
thing goes wrong. Very similar to the captain-on-land concept is the Maritime Un-
manned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) concept, however, this 
concept allows more autonomy for the ship [12]. The MUNIN concept is investigated 
further in the next chapter. 
2.1.2 The MUNIN Concept 
The MUNIN -project is one of the most prevalent research projects in the field of au-
tonomous shipping. The project focuses on four specific areas: 
1. Advanced sensor module 
2. Autonomous navigation system 
3. Autonomous engine monitoring and control system 
4. Shore control center 
The interworking of these modules can be seen in Figure 2. The MUNIN -project de-
fines a deep-sea navigational process for autonomous sailing from one port to another 
but does not define the autonomous operation of a vessel at the port area. The infor-
mation in this chapter is referenced from the MUNIN -projects document “D8.6: Final 
Report: Autonomous Bridge” [12] if not otherwise specified. 
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Figure 2.  Overview of the high-level MUNIN concept modules. [12] 
The advanced sensor module is used to maintain an automatic lookout for obstacles and 
other ships, as well as environmental conditions around the ship. The module includes 
and integrates the data of GPS, marine radar, Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
receiver, and daylight and infrared cameras. It also uses National Marine Electronics 
Association (NMEA) data. 
NMEA 2000 is a standard for connections and data specifications between marine elec-
tronics. NMEA data includes data from all possible electronic systems of the ship. [13] 
The high-level task of the autonomous navigation system is to navigate the ship from 
point to point safely. It works tasks such as conducting weather routing, determining 
ship dynamics, controlling buoyancy and stability, avoiding collisions, and managing 
alarms and emergencies. 
The engine monitoring and control system monitors all the components of the engine 
room and controls the engine. It can alert the shore control center in case of critical or 
difficult operations that it thinks the autonomous navigation system can’t handle at this 
moment. 
The shore control center can take control of the ship if needed. In the center, operators 
monitor the ship and its systems around the clock. In addition to ship operators, each 
shore control center has a center captain who is responsible for each ship under the 
command of the center. There is also a center engineer who will attend technical prob-
lems. The operators report any necessary information to the captain and engineer. 
This thesis will focus on autonomous ships that follow the MUNIN concept. 
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2.1.3 Possible Problems 
There are a number of possible problems that might delay the commercial deployment 
of autonomous vessels. These problems range from regulatory and legal constraints to 
technological and financial viability, and safety concerns. The possible problems intro-
duced in this chapter are referenced from the paper “Autonomous merchant vessels: 
examination of factors that impact the effective implementation of unmanned ships” 
[14] by Hogg et al. if not otherwise specified. 
The biggest regulatory organ within the maritime industry is the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). IMO has not yet been convinced that autonomous shipping is safe, 
so there are still no common regulations for autonomous ships. Development of regula-
tions is expected to start in the late 2017. However, for remote-controlled and autono-
mous shipping to become a reality, changes at all regulatory levels are needed. Legisla-
tion at national and international levels needs to change and take autonomous shipping 
into account in the future. [2] 
According to insurance companies, the most important thing regarding ship security is 
the quality of crew on board. This leads to a problem regarding insuring unmanned au-
tonomous ships. A lot of work is needed to create new insurance policies to cover and 
determine duty and liability constraints for unmanned shipowners and operators. 
There will be a lot of data flowing between the autonomous ship and the shore control 
center all the time. Most of the data will be simple sensor readings which can be sent 
through a cheap satellite link, but the constant data flow will still be costly. When the 
control center needs to take control of the ship or when high quality video feed from the 
ship is needed, a better satellite link is needed. These are currently rare, and the use is 
costly. Multiple backup connections are also needed in these critical moments. Closer to 
the shore cellular networks can be used which provide higher bandwidth, better quality, 
and lower costs. It is expected that more high quality and high bandwidth satellite links 
will become available in the future, but for now the connectivity at sea is a huge prob-
lem for the autonomous operation of ships. 
The huge amounts of data that the shore control center receives from the ship could be a 
problem if not dealt with accordingly. The control center could become swamped with 
data and the operators would not find the data that they need to monitor the ship. The 
data needs to be processed and presented in a clear manner so that the operator can do 
his job. This requires good systems to be developed at the control centers to be able to 
deal with the whole dataflow and not lose any parts of the important data. 
Another problem might arise from the way the industry will receive autonomous ship-
ping. It is anticipated that there will not be instantaneous savings for shipping compa-
nies from going towards autonomy. So, the companies might not have enough incentive 
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to go for autonomy, which might in turn delay the era of autonomous ships. Traditional 
manned ships could also pose a problem for autonomous ships as no one knows how the 
crews will react when they encounter autonomous ships. 
For autonomous shipping to become common, it needs to be economically viable. The 
reduced crew costs will not alone cover the needed investments, at least in the short 
term. The ships and the shipping chain also need to be more efficient for commercial 
success. This poses a great challenge for autonomous ship developers, as just develop-
ing a working autonomous ship is not enough, the ship also needs to be more efficient 
than the currently used cargo ships. [2] 
As there is no crew onboard an autonomous ship, there is no one to perform emergency 
repairs if equipment fails. This means that monitoring the equipment and doing preven-
tative maintenances will be the key to success. This also means that many critical navi-
gation and automation systems would need to be duplicated and other redundancy be 
introduced in the systems of the ship. This would be costly and could be a problem for 
the economic viability of autonomous shipping. 
Another huge problem for autonomous shipping will be physical and cyber security 
onboard the ships and regarding the whole maritime industry. These problems are so 
imperative for this thesis that they have their own subchapter right below this one. 
2.2 Security Challenges at Sea 
The maritime sector faces many challenges regarding cyber security. A few major prob-
lems in the field are explained below. This part of the thesis is largely a summary of 
chapter 2 of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) report 
“Analysis of Cyber Security Aspects in the Maritime Sector” [8]. The report gives a 
good look into the current state of cyber security in the maritime industry. 
Awareness regarding cyber security is very low in the maritime sector. This applies to 
all the actors in the field, including government bodies, port authorities, and maritime 
companies. This might be caused by the yet relatively low number of cyber incidents in 
the sector and the low exposure these incidents receive. Yet, it is apparent that the use of 
ICT systems, and hence the threat of cyber incidents, is increasing in the sector and 
more focus on cyber security is needed. The low awareness means that a cyberattack 
towards any maritime ICT systems could be devastating as the incident response would 
likely be lacking. 
The ICT systems in the maritime industry, be it at ports or on ships, are usually complex 
and use a large amount of different technologies. The fast development of new technol-
ogy and the move towards automation and autonomy in the sector both contribute to 
poor cyber security in some cases. The big problem in the field is inadequate standardi-
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zation and lack of good practices regarding cyber security in these ICT environments. 
All this leads to the fact that these systems are particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks. 
A big problem within the maritime industry is that the maritime governance is highly 
fragmented to stakeholders on different levels. There are several global, regional, and 
national stakeholders in play and there is lack of coordination between these stakehold-
ers. This brings major discrepancies in how maritime cyber security is handled and 
causes big differences between maritime zones. The clear definition of responsibilities 
and roles to be taken regarding cyber security also becomes problematic because of this 
fragmentation of policies and governance. Adding to this problem is ports that are being 
privatized, as the ICT and security standards on these ports are largely dependent on the 
owner of the port. If the owner doesn’t care about the security aspects, they can get 
mostly ignored and this can cause problems in the big picture of maritime cyber securi-
ty. 
Maritime regulations on global, regional, and national levels currently include very little 
on maritime cyber security elements. These regulations mostly include safety and phys-
ical security concerns. New regulations are likely to include cyber security as well, but 
they are still quite far away in the future. This means that meanwhile the industry needs 
to work together to self-regulate the cyber security aspects. There are already some ini-
tiatives to cooperate within the industry, but this is not yet sufficient, and more work 
needs to be done to get the whole industry on the same page. 
There is currently no holistic approach to maritime cyber security. Stakeholders are set-
ting cyber security expectations and measures on their own and everyone is doing things 
differently. This leads to only a part of the risks being considered and addressed. A 
large portion of the risks are completely ignored, and this leaves the maritime industry 
vulnerable to large scale cyberattacks. 
In addition to all the other problems, that maritime cyber security faces, there is also no 
economic incentive for the stakeholders to implement good cyber security in the mari-
time sector. This is caused by the fact that insurance companies have not yet taken cyber 
security aspects regarding the maritime sector into account. This means that there is no 
separate insurance for the maritime ICT systems and hence no guidelines that the im-
plemented cyber security should follow to get the insurance payouts. This is the case in 
many other industries already and needs to be included in the maritime industry as well, 
to give the stakeholders more incentive to implement good cyber security practices. 
All these challenges that maritime cyber security faces make the maritime industry a 
prime target for cyberattacks right now. The attackers are often motivated by monetary 
gain. Some attacks try to steal money directly from the affected companies while others 
aim at smuggling contraband cargo via penetrating the port’s ICT systems. In addition, 
there are the attackers that aim to infiltrating, controlling, or damaging critical infra-
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structure. Disrupting the shipping industry could very well have a significant economic 
impact on the global scale. [9] 
2.2.1 Physical Security 
The Maritime Security Section of IMO is responsible for giving guidelines and policies 
regarding physical security to the entire industry. IMO has been providing these guide-
lines and policies since the 1980s and continues to keep them up-to-date. This is in stark 
contrast to the situation with cyber security where no common regulations or guidelines 
are present. This chapter is a summary of IMO guidelines given in the paper “IMO Mar-
itime Security Measures - Background” [15]. 
IMO’s policies give governments the chance to set a security level that applies to ships 
and port facilities in their governance. There are 3 different security levels for different 
situations. Security Level 1 means normal operations. Security Level 2 means that there 
is a heightened risk of a security incident. Security Level 3 means that the risk of a secu-
rity incident is probable or imminent. 
Maritime physical security includes securing supply chains, port facilities, and ships as 
well as protecting the environment. All these actions are seen as risk management activ-
ities which means that risk assessment is needed in all of the cases. IMO provides the 
industry with standardized and consistent framework for evaluating and responding to 
risks. In addition to the risk assessment and management, there are also some minimum 
functional security requirements for ports and ships. For ships, these requirements in-
clude: 
1. Ship security plans 
2. Ship security officers 
3. Company security officers 
4. Certain onboard equipment 
5. Monitoring and controlling access 
6. Monitoring the activities of people and cargo 
7. Ensuring that security communications are readily available 
There are also similar requirements for port facilities, but this thesis will focus on the 
case of ships as per the scope set in Chapter 1. These requirements are further explained 
in the coming paragraphs. 
The ship security plan specifies the minimum operational and physical security 
measures that the ship needs to take always. This includes operations at Security Level 
1. The plan also indicates the additional security measures that need to be taken to get 
the ship to Security Level 2. For Security Level 3 the plan specifies the preparatory ac-
tions that need to be taken so that the ship can swiftly respond to a security incident or 
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threat. The ship security plan and any changes to it need to be approved by the adminis-
trator of the ship. 
Every shipping company needs to appoint a company security officer and a ship securi-
ty officer for each of their ships. The security officers have many responsibilities includ-
ing ensuring that the ship security assessment is undertaken, and the ship security plan 
is prepared. They also monitor the effectiveness of the ship security plan and ensure that 
the plan is followed. All their responsibilities are defined in IMO’s guidelines. 
Examples of required onboard equipment include automatic identification systems and 
ship security alert systems. The automatic identification system provides information 
like the unique identification, position, course, and speed of the ship. The ship security 
alert system is used by seafarers to notify other ships and autorities of a terrorist hijack-
ing. 
Monitoring and controlling physical access to the ship at port and at sea depend largely 
on risk assessment. Different equipment for this purpose is used for example in different 
regions and with different ship types. Seafarer identification documents are also an im-
portant part of access control. Monitoring the activities of people and cargo is the re-
sponsibility of the ship security officer. Most ships are fitted with security cameras for 
monitoring purposes, but this is not required. 
All of these requirements seem important also in the case of autonomous ships. Espe-
cially the requirement for readily available security communications is interesting for 
this thesis. Of course, the requirements need to be specified for the case of autonomous 
ships later. For example, even though there is no one on board the ship, there can be a 
ship security officer at the control center. 
In the case of autonomous ships, the physical security threats are little different than in 
traditional shipping. There is no crew, so the protection of crew is not required. The 
vulnerable parts in an autonomous ship would be the cargo and the ship itself. The big-
gest physical threats at sea would probably be the stealing of cargo and attacks meant to 
damage the ship in some way. Another threat would be traditional ships and vessels as it 
is impossible to know how the crews react to autonomous ships. At ports, the biggest 
threat is unauthorized access to the ship and possible tampering with its equipment. 
2.2.2 Cyber Security 
By now it is apparent that cyber security is still a problematic thing in the maritime in-
dustry. Clear policies and regulations on cyber security onboard ships and at ports are 
missing. IMO has only just recently started giving high-level recommendations on mari-
time cyber risk management, the latest draft being from July 2017 [16]. These are basic 
recommendations and a lot of work is needed before IMO can provide the industry with 
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real policies. There are, however, some guidelines on cyber security developed by com-
panies and organizations in the industry based on IMO’s recommendations. 
Here we take a look at these guidelines to see the threats and vulnerabilities that there 
are considering cyber security onboard ships. We also consider possible preventative 
measures and fixes for these threats and vulnerabilities. This chapter is mostly refer-
enced from the paper “The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships” [17], which 
has been written in collaboration by many of the biggest companies in the maritime in-
dustry. 
Cyber security should always be a part of the risk assessment and management in both 
company and ship levels. According to “The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard 
Ships”, cyber risk management should: 
• identify the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and management 
both ashore and on board. 
• identify the systems, assets, data, and capabilities, which if disrupted, could pose 
risks to the operations and safety of the ship. 
• implement technical measures to protect against a cyber incident and ensure the 
continuity of operations. This may include the configuration of networks, access 
control to networks and systems, communication and boundary defense, and the 
use of protection and detection software. 
• implement activities and plans (procedural protection measures) to provide resil-
ience against cyber incidents. This may include training and increasing aware-
ness, software maintenance, remote and local access, access privileges, use of 
removable media, and equipment disposal. 
• implement activities to prepare for and respond to cyber incidents. 
This is very similar to physical security management but requires technical knowledge 
of cyber security and ICT systems. 
It is recommended to use multiple layers of protective measures to make the systems 
cyber resilient. Using multiple layers of protection increases the probability that a cyber 
incident is detected and removes a considerable number of false positives. A combina-
tion of physical security of the ship, protection of networks, intrusion detection, soft-
ware whitelisting, access and user controls, password policies, and personnel awareness 
of risks will result in good cyber resilience. Onboard ships, where integration between 
cyber systems is high, it is also important to prevent vulnerabilities in a system that can 
be used to gain access to another system. 
Different groups or individuals are interested in exploiting any cyber vulnerabilities a 
ship might have, for different reasons. Even a company’s own employee might uninten-
tionally compromise cyber systems or data while working on the company’s ICT sys-
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tems. Table 1 contains different groups, their motivation for exploiting cyber vulnerabil-
ities, and the goals they want to reach by exploiting them. 
Table 1. Groups exploiting cyber vulnerabilities. [17] 
Group Motivation Objective 
Activists Reputational damage, 
Disruption of operations 
Destruction of data, 
Publication of sensitive data, 
Media attention, 
Denial of access to service or system 
Criminals Financial gain, 
Commercial espionage, 
Industrial espionage 
Selling stolen data, 
Ransoming stolen data or systems, 
Arranging transportation of contraband 
cargo, 
Gathering intelligence for another crime 
Opportunists The challenge Getting through cyber security defenses, 
Financial gain 
State sponsored 
organizations, 
Terrorists 
Political gain, 
Espionage 
Gaining knowledge, 
Disruption to economies and critical 
national infrastructure 
Company  
employees 
Dissatisfaction with the 
company, 
Human error 
Damaging the company or the ship 
 
There are two types of possible cyberattacks that can affect ships. These are targeted 
and untargeted attacks. In a targeted attack the ship is the intended target, whereas in an 
untargeted attack the ship is one of many possible targets. Untargeted attacks usually 
exploit known vulnerabilities that might exist in some systems that the ship uses. Tools 
for untargeted attacks are widely available in the Internet. Here are some examples of 
these tools: 
• Malware 
• Social engineering 
• Phishing 
• Watering hole attack 
• Scanning 
Targeted attacks, however, often use tools and techniques specifically tailored to attack 
this exact ship. Here are some examples of these tools: 
• Brute force 
• Denial of service 
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• Spear-phishing 
• Subverting the supply chain 
These examples are of course not exhaustive and only show the most commonly used 
tools and techniques. The tools and techniques are always evolving to counteract the 
evolving of cyber security. New kinds of attacks are observed every year. 
Most cyberattacks are conducted on stages. First stage is surveying or reconnaissance, 
where information is collected about the target ship or company. Second stage is deliv-
ery, where the attacker attempts to access the systems of the ship. The third stage is 
breach, where the attacker gains access to some of the equipment of the ship. The last 
stage is effect, where the attacker does what he came to do to the breached system. Most 
cyberattacks are stopped during the second or third stages thanks to good cyber security 
on the targeted system. 
Ships and especially autonomous ships have a large amount of systems onboard. Any of 
these systems could potentially be vulnerable to a cyberattack. Here is a list of potential-
ly vulnerable systems onboard ships: 
• Communication systems 
• Bridge systems 
• Propulsion and machinery management and power control systems 
• Access control systems 
• Cargo management systems 
• Core infrastructure systems 
There is a list of equipment that these systems might include in Appendix A. 
Recently, ships have grown more reliant on the ship-to-shore interface, which is nowa-
days used to conduct many different tasks. Especially with the introduction of autono-
mous ships this interface and the satellite link will see even more use and be a key sys-
tem to protect from cyberattacks. 
2.2.3 Cyber Threats Specific to Autonomous Shipping 
Autonomous ships are such a new thing that not much research has yet been done about 
cyber threats specifically concerning them. There is, however, some research about 
cyber threats towards autonomous vehicles. Here we take a look at the paper “Cyber 
Threats Facing Autonomous and Connected Vehicles: Future Challenges” [18] by Par-
kinson et al. that focuses on threats towards autonomous cars. These threats are exam-
ined hypothetically in the autonomous shipping world. 
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In the case of autonomous vehicles, it was discovered that many vulnerabilities lie in the 
different sensor systems that the vehicle uses to get information about its surroundings, 
position, speed, etc. In the case of the MUNIN concept of autonomous vessels it would 
mean that the advanced sensor module is vulnerable to cyber threats. This is probably 
true as the advanced sensor module contains many similar or same sensors that an au-
tonomous vehicle does, and hence will have similar vulnerabilities. All the sensors in 
the advanced sensor module are susceptible to getting false data fed to them. This kind 
of attack usually requires the attacker to have physical access to the sensor, but it is also 
possible to hack into the connections and to falsify the data feed. False sensor data 
could have all kinds of effects in the other systems of the vessel. 
GPS spoofing where a strong counterfeit GPS signal is generated and directed towards 
the vessel could be a possible attack scenario. This counterfeit signal would overtake the 
real GPS signals as GPS is usually set to use the strongest signal. This could cause the 
vessel to take course wherever the attackers want the vessel to go. Another attack sce-
nario could be GPS jamming where radio noise is broadcast on the GPS frequency. This 
noise blocks the use of GPS and could disable the vessel’s ability to navigate. 
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) sensors are used to measure distance to objects 
and to produce a 3D map of the environment. This is used for localization, obstacle 
avoidance, and navigation. LIDAR measures the flight time of a pulse of light to meas-
ure the distance between a sensor and an object. LIDAR spoofing or jamming is easy to 
do with low cost equipment, namely pointing a laser at the right frequency towards the 
LIDAR receiver. This can cause the vessel to think that there is a big object ahead and 
that it needs to stop. This attack requires the attacker to be close and can be used to 
board the autonomous vessel. 
Daylight and infrared cameras are used for a similar purpose as LIDAR. These cameras 
can be disabled by simply shining a bright light at them. A bright enough light could 
also accidentally get reflected towards the cameras to temporarily disable them. This 
could easily cause the vessel not to detect an obstacle ahead and a crash could happen. 
The autonomous engine monitoring and control system and the autonomous navigation 
system of the MUNIN concept have similar functions and uses as the several engine 
control units in an autonomous vehicle. The engine control units of an autonomous ve-
hicle have several tens of millions of lines of code between them, so a huge amount of 
lines of code could be assumed for the systems of an autonomous vessel as well. Such a 
huge amount of code makes code reviews infeasible and many vulnerabilities in the 
code are there just waiting to be found. Many such vulnerabilities have been found in 
the case of autonomous vehicles and it is evident that vulnerabilities will also exist in 
the case of autonomous vessels. 
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In the MUNIN concept, the shore control center could also be susceptible to cyberat-
tacks. An attacker could gain access to the systems of the control center and could affect 
the ship that way. Also, intercepting the communications between the ship and the con-
trol center and possibly changing the communications could be a possibility. It is im-
portant to notice that cyber security implications affect the whole system of a ship con-
nected to the control center, instead of only affecting the ship. 
2.2.4 Example Incidents 
Maritime cyberattacks are becoming quite common because maritime cyber security is 
lacking, and the maritime industry is hence seen as an easy target. Many of these inci-
dents are, however, not reported at all and just kept inside the company. Here are some 
incidents that have been reported from around the world. 
Belgium, 2011 
There was a big cyberattack towards the port of Antwerp going on between 2011 and 
2013. Drug smugglers had employed hackers to hack into the port’s systems to allow 
them access to secure data about locations and security details of containers. This al-
lowed the drug traffickers to place heroin and cocaine inside seemingly legitimate con-
tainers that they could then empty before anyone would suspect anything. This plot was 
going strong for about two years, but eventually the security breach was discovered and 
at least some of the criminals involved were brought to justice. Similar attacks are most 
likely ongoing right now elsewhere in the world and some have been discovered since 
the Antwerp incident. These kinds of attack have been coined “ghost shipping”. [19] 
Global, 2017 
In 2017 a computer virus affected the ICT systems of the world’s biggest container 
shipping line and operator of tens of ports, Maersk. The attack caused many of 
Maersk’s ICT systems to shut down completely and crippled its operations for several 
days. Cargo ports all around the world were closed as normal operations could not be 
carried out. The ports had lost all information about what cargo each container con-
tained, so it was impossible to deliver or receive any cargo until the ICT systems were 
operational once again. It took Maersk days until operations were back to normal at 
their ports and this caused big problems in the logistic chains of many cargo owners 
across the world. [20] 
India, 2012 
In 2012, two separate incidents happened off the coast of India. In the first incident, two 
Indian fishermen were shot by Italian marines on board a merchant vessel because the 
fishermen were thought to be pirates attacking the merchant vessel. In the second inci-
dent, three fishermen were killed in a hit-and-run accident. What makes these incidents 
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similar and related to cyber security, however, is the fact that in both cases the data col-
lected by the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) was corrupted or lost. A VDR is a device 
that records crucial data about the position and speed of the ship, as well as audio re-
cordings from the bridge, and radar images. It can be likened to a black box on air-
planes. In both cases it is suspected that the crews of the ships had tampered with the 
VDRs to conceal their wrongdoings. This can be seen as a cyberattack towards the 
equipment of the ship. [21]  
Singapore, 2017 
A collision between the US navy destroyer USS McCain and a merchant vessel called 
Alnic MC took place off the coast of Singapore in 2017. As a result of the collision, 10 
sailors aboard the USS McCain were killed and 5 were injured. At first there were spec-
ulations that a cyberattack targeted at the USS McCain caused the collision, but these 
claims were quickly dismissed by the US navy. A new hypothesis has surfaced since, 
that claims that the merchant vessel Alnic MC was the target of a cyberattack that 
caused the collision. This has not yet been confirmed or denied but it seems more likely, 
since commercial equipment is way easier to hack into than military equipment. This 
was the fourth incident this year involving a US navy ship and the second similar inci-
dent in quick succession. This has sparked speculations that the US navy is a target of 
some kind of an attack and the navy has tightened its cyber security and added cyber 
causes to the list of things they investigate relating to any incident. [22] 
Russia, 2017 
At least 20 ships were affected by a GPS spoofing attack in the Black Sea in 2017. Ac-
cording to GPS all the ships were over 32 kilometers inland at Gelendzhik Airport. The 
false GPS signal thankfully didn’t cause any collisions or damages to the affected ships. 
Experts think that this was the first case of GPS spoofing ever documented outside of 
controlled tests. It has been speculated that the spoofing attack was caused by Russia 
testing new electronic warfare technologies. [23] 
21 
3. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING 
A cyber security incident is an event that disrupts normal operations. It may indicate 
that an organization’s network, ICT systems, or data have been compromised or that a 
protective measure set in place to protect these has failed. The International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO) standard for information security incident management, 
ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016, defines an information security incident as follows: “One or 
multiple related and identified information security events that can harm an organiza-
tion's assets or compromise its operations.” [24] and the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) computer security incident handling guide, NIST Special Pub-
lication 800-61, defines it as: “A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer 
security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” [25]. 
A cyber security incident can result in multiple negative impacts, for example financial 
loss, legal issues, loss of productivity, or loss of company reputation [26]. These inci-
dents need to be managed to minimize the negative impact on the organization. Infor-
mation security incident management is quite heavily standardized and the two standard 
approaches that stand out the most are the ISO/IEC 27035-1:2016 [24] and the NIST 
Special Publication 800-61 [25]. They both offer a similar structure for incident man-
agement. 
 
Figure 3.  Incident management life cycle. 
As seen in Figure 3, incident management can be both proactive and reactive. The pro-
active part includes planning, preparing and risk assessment. It is there to prevent inci-
dents, to raise awareness within the organization, and to make sure that the organization 
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is ready to act when an incident takes place. The reactive part kicks in when an incident 
occurs and lasts until normal operations are restored. It includes detecting the incident, 
collecting data about it, reporting the incident to the right audience, assessing and vali-
dating it, containing the incident, choosing the right actions and acting on them, recov-
ering from the incident, and learning from it. After that it is right back to the proactive 
part and setting up preventative measures so that a similar incident won’t happen again. 
[26] 
3.1 The Common Practices of Incident Reporting 
For this thesis’ purposes the most interesting parts of the incident reporting and man-
agement process are the detection and reporting phase, and the assessment and valida-
tion phase. A linear model of the incident reporting and handling process can be seen in 
Figure 4. The parts that we are interested in are shown in green and the rest are greyed 
out. 
 
Figure 4.  The phases of the incident reporting and handling process. 
Incident detection, reporting, and validation can all happen either manually or automati-
cally. Here is a list of some sources where incidents can be detected: 
• Alerts from security monitoring systems such as intrusion detection (and preven-
tion) systems, antivirus software, honeypots, log monitoring systems, security 
information and event management systems, and correlation engines. 
• Alerts from network monitoring systems such as firewalls, network flow analy-
sis, and web filtering. 
• Analysis of log information from various systems and devices. 
• User reports and notifications from third parties. 
This list is gotten from the article “Information Security Incident Management: Current 
Practice as Reported in the Literature” [26] by Tøndel et al. 
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After an incident is detected, all possible data about it should be collected from all pos-
sible sources and stored securely. Then all the relevant information about the incident 
should be made available in some kind of an incident tracking solution, with date and 
time of the incident. [26] 
In all cases it is not so straightforward to know where an incident needs to be reported 
[27]. In our case of incidents happening on an autonomous ship, however, it is straight-
forward that the incident needs to be reported to the shore control center responsible for 
the ship. These incidents are mostly discovered and reported by either the equipment of 
the ship or by the equipment or personnel of the control center, rather than an outside 
observer. If the incident can’t be solved in-house or it affects people outside the organi-
zation, the incident is further reported, perhaps to the national Computer Security Inci-
dent Response Team (CSIRT) or any other valid audience [27]. 
In the assessment and validation phase, all the information about the incident is assessed 
and a decision is made whether the event is an information security incident or a false 
positive [26]. Three different incident discovery and validation schemes are shown in 
Figure 5. In the figure, the red number ones indicate the entry point for the incident re-
sponse process. 
 
Figure 5.  Schemes of incident discovery and validation. [27] 
After a real incident is detected, the organization’s CSIRT decides how the incident 
should be addressed, who should do it, and with what priority. The organization should 
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have a classification scale for incidents, based on impact on affected systems and assets, 
to help prioritize incident management. After these decisions are made, the right per-
sonnel are contacted and given their assignments and the incident response phase can 
start. [26] 
3.2 Data Modeling 
Data modeling is the act of representing real-world facts as symbols or codes and organ-
izing them into tables and columns in a database [28]. For example, time can be repre-
sented in countless formats, but the model ensures that the format is the same every 
time in this particular database.  
A well-designed data model can give the organization leverage in a sense that it can 
make the programming and designing of the rest of the organization’s ICT systems 
cheaper and easier. Also, a poor data model can become costly as changes to data mod-
els will incur huge costs as other systems need to be changed as well. Data modeling 
helps represent data in a more concise format. This means that only important data is 
present and easily accessible. Data modeling also improves data quality as inaccurate 
data is easier to spot and remove. [28] 
There are certain characteristics that a good data model fulfils. Here are some of them: 
• Completeness, in a sense that the model supports all the data that is necessary 
for the system. 
• Non-redundancy, meaning no data is represented in two or more separate loca-
tions. 
• Enforcement of business rules, for example two incidents can’t have the same 
incident ID. 
• Data reusability, in a sense that the data should be usable in other applications 
than the originally intended one as well. 
• Stability and flexibility, meaning the model’s ability to adapt to changing busi-
ness requirements. 
• Elegance, as in neat and simple classification of the data. 
• Communication, meaning that the data is easily shareable with various stake-
holders. 
Fulfilling all the above characteristics would be great but probably not realistic. A good 
balance between the characteristics makes a good data model. Performance could also 
be seen as one of the important characteristics of a good data model, but it is so heavily 
dependent on the software and hardware platforms on which the database will run that it 
really differs from the aforementioned characteristics. [28] 
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3.3 Current Methods of Incident Data Modeling and Sharing 
Even today, many security incidents are handled by humans using human-readable data 
models that are specific to organizations [27]. However, automation is a growing trend 
and many machine-readable data models are being developed. This means that machine-
readable data models are used, and the data is formatted into human-readable form 
when needed.  
Data modeling is needed so that the incident data can be represented in a concise and 
precise manner. Using a data model also ensures that all the important data about an 
incident is collected. Sometimes companies also share incident data with each other 
[27]. This is done so that similar incidents can be prevented from happening or can be 
reacted to faster elsewhere. It could be argued that a data model that is machine-
readable, widely used, and easy to convert to a form that is readable by humans would 
be the best. 
In the following chapters a couple of these machine-readable incident data modeling 
and sharing methods are described. The focus is kept on the data models, but the data 
sharing methods that are developed with the data models are also shortly explained. 
3.3.1 IODEF 
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) is an information framework to 
represent computer and network security incidents. It is being developed by the Man-
aged Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE) working group of the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF). MILE also develops Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) and 
Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange (ROLIE) which both are tools of 
incident data sharing. [29] 
The MILE working group develops standards to support computer and network security 
incident management. They focus on data models and transport protocols to enable the 
secure exchange of incident information. Although the data models and transport proto-
cols are developed together they can be used independently. This means that the data 
model could be used with different transport methods and the transport protocols could 
be used to transport information formatted in different data models. [30] 
Version 2 of IODEF is defined in RFC 7970 as “A data representation for security in-
cident reports and indicators commonly exchanged by operational security teams for 
mitigation and watch and warning.” [31]. The RFC provides IODEF’s data model spec-
ified with the XML schema. Recently, the MILE working group has also started work-
ing on providing the data model in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format [32]. 
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The highest-level object of the IODEF data model is the IODEF-Document class. It 
contains attributes for version, language, schema, and so on. The aggregate classes of 
this class are Incident and AdditionalData. There can be one or more of the Incident 
class and each of them contains information related to a single incident. The Addi-
tionalData class can be used to apply extensions, there can be zero or more of these. 
[31] 
The Incident class contains multiple attributes and has a wide variety of aggregate clas-
ses [31]. Information like incident ID, detection time, reporting time, description and 
event data can be found inside the incident class. The descriptions of all the attributes 
and aggregate classes can be found in RFC 7970. A representation of the Incident class 
can be found in Figure 6. 
+------------------------+ 
| Incident               | 
+------------------------+ 
| ENUM purpose           |<>----------[ IncidentID ] 
| STRING ext-purpose     |<>--{0..1}--[ AlternativeID ] 
| ENUM status            |<>--{0..*}--[ RelatedActivity ] 
| STRING ext-status      |<>--{0..1}--[ DetectTime ] 
| ENUM xml:lang          |<>--{0..1}--[ StartTime ] 
| ENUM restriction       |<>--{0..1}--[ EndTime ] 
| STRING ext-restriction |<>--{0..1}--[ RecoveryTime ] 
| ID observable-id       |<>--{0..1}--[ ReportTime ] 
|                        |<>----------[ GenerationTime ] 
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ] 
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ Discovery ] 
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ Assessment ] 
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ Method ] 
|                        |<>--{1..*}--[ Contact ] 
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ EventData ] 
|                        |<>--{0..1}--[ IndicatorData ] 
|                        |<>--{0..1}--[ History ] 
|                        |<>--{0..*}--[ AdditionalData ] 
+------------------------+ 
 
Figure 6.  A representation of the IODEF Incident class. [31] 
Guidelines to defining extensions to IODEF are explained in RFC 6684. The extensions 
can be used to include industry-specific data in the data model of IODEF. Before defin-
ing an extension, it is important to go through the IODEF specifications and ensure that 
this data can’t already be included in the data model somehow, as IODEF has a wide set 
of incident-related classes. Some extensions can be made public by MILE and some 
stay organization specific. [33] 
RFC 6545 defines RID and it is described as “A proactive inter-network communication 
method to facilitate sharing incident-handling data while integrating existing detection, 
tracing, source identification, and mitigation mechanisms for a complete incident-
handling solution.” [34]. RID can be used to transport incident data between known 
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peers when high levels of security and privacy are needed [30]. RID is mainly used as a 
point-to-point transport protocol.  
ROLIE can be used for the publication, sharing, or discovery of security automation 
information. The point is to provide access to a repository of security automation infor-
mation in IODEF or other data format. The access can be restricted to internal use or it 
can be completely public. All the information is organized, categorized, and described, 
and the user can search through the information that he has access to. [35] 
3.3.2 STIX 
Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) is a language and serialization format 
used to exchange cyber threat intelligence. It is being developed by the OASIS cyber 
threat intelligence technical committee. OASIS is a non-profit consortium that tries to 
advance open standards for the information society. The technical committee also de-
velops Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII) that is a pro-
tocol used to exchange cyber threat intelligence. [36] 
The STIX data model is represented in JSON format. The model is machine-readable 
and easily convertible to a human-readable form. The data model consists of objects that 
can contain all kinds of information about the described cyber threat. The two types of 
objects are domain objects and relationship objects. These form a connected graph of 
nodes and edges, domain objects being the nodes and relationship objects the edges. A 
list of STIX objects and their short descriptions are provided in Table 2. [37] 
Table 2. STIX objects and their descriptions. [38] 
Domain Objects Description 
Attack Pattern Ways threat actors try to compromise targets. 
Campaign A set of malicious activities or attacks that occur over a peri-
od of time against a specific set of targets. 
Course of Action An action taken to either prevent an attack or respond to an 
attack. 
Identity Individuals, organizations or groups. 
Indicator A pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious 
cyber activity. 
Intrusion Set A grouped set of adversarial behaviors and resources with 
common properties believed to be orchestrated by a single 
threat actor. 
Malware Malicious code and malicious software, used to compromise 
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a victim’s data 
or system. 
Observed Data Conveys information observed on a system or network. 
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Report Collections of threat intelligence focused on one or more top-
ics, such as a description of a threat actor, malware, or attack 
technique, including contextual details. 
Threat Actor Individuals, groups, or organizations believed to be operating 
with malicious intent. 
Tool Legitimate software that can be used by threat actors to per-
form attacks. 
Vulnerability A mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker to 
gain access to a system or network. 
Relationship Objects Description 
Relationship Used to link two Domain Objects and to describe how they 
are related to each other. 
Sighting Denotes the belief that an element of cyber threat intelligence 
was seen (e.g., indicator, malware). 
 
All the STIX objects contain properties that describe the object. These can include type, 
name, id, time created, and many more. In addition to properties, the domain objects can 
contain relationships with each other. These are described with relationship objects that 
are embedded in the domain objects. [39] 
STIX has many specific vocabularies to be used with objects. All the data types, full 
object descriptions, and vocabularies can be found in the STIX specifications. STIX can 
also be customized for specific use cases with custom properties and custom objects. 
The STIX data model schema is provided in JSON format. [37] 
TAXII is an application layer protocol for the communication of cyber threat infor-
mation in a simple and scalable manner. It is mainly meant for sharing cyber threat in-
formation between organizations. TAXII defines two primary services: 
• Collection: A repository of cyber threat information that can be accessed by cli-
ents via a request-response model. 
• Channel: A server to which cyber threat information can be published and the 
information is distributed to subscribing clients. 
TAXII is developed with STIX, but they are not required to be used together and can 
see individual use with different data models or transport methods. [40] 
3.3.3 VERIS 
The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) is a set of metrics 
designed to provide a common language for describing security incidents in a structured 
and repeatable manner, developed by the VERIS community. The goal of VERIS is to 
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collect incident-specific data and to share that with others in an anonymous and respon-
sible manner. The VERIS community provides an open and free repository of incident 
information in VERIS format. [41] 
The VERIS data model is represented in JSON, which makes it machine-readable. 
However, lots of work has gone into making the VERIS schema easily readable by hu-
mans as well. The VERIS schema is organized into five major sections: 
• Incident tracking 
• Victim demographics 
• Incident description 
• Discovery & response 
• Impact assessment 
Each section contains multiple items that describe the incident. The full list of items on 
each section can be found in the VERIS schema documentation. [41] 
The VERIS schema provides enough information about an incident that it can be used 
for preventing further attacks, but it doesn’t provide things like indicators of compro-
mise and other technical data. The focus is on strategic and risk-based information and 
as such the VERIS schema should only be used as a tool to share information with other 
organizations, rather than using it as an incident reporting tool within the organization. 
[41] 
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4. INCIDENT DATA REPORTING MODEL DESIGN 
As explained in Chapter 2, autonomous shipping is a new and developing industry, and 
many things in the field don’t yet have common practices. This includes incident data 
reporting. Based on this, it is important to research and test different data models to find 
the most suitable one for this use case. There are also some specialties that come with 
this use case, especially the fact that the target of cyberattacks is moving. This leads to 
us probably wanting some positional information, like GPS data, in the incident data 
model. 
During the research phase for Chapters 2 and 3, it became apparent that good incident 
data reporting models already exist. This means that designing a completely new model 
would be redundant and a waste of time. Instead, an existing model is applied for our 
use case. This is done by thoroughly examining the existing model and ensuring that it 
can represent all the data that is needed for the use case of reporting an incident from an 
autonomous ship to the shore control center. 
Especially IODEF seems like a great fit for this use case. The IODEF data model has a 
vast number of classes to describe incidents and it can even be complemented with ex-
tensions to provide case specific classes and attributes. IODEF is also specifically de-
signed to be a format for transporting data [31], and not storing it, and that is exactly 
what is needed here. It is available in both XML and JSON formats, so organizations 
can choose their preferred format. IODEF is also the closest thing to a standard in the 
field right now as it is developed by an IETF working group, and the RFC for IODEF is 
already labeled as a proposed standard. 
This chapter provides insight into what the data model should be able to represent. The 
IODEF specification is also looked into more closely. It is also investigated whether an 
extension is needed for this use case or not. If an extension is needed, a basic design for 
an extension is given in this chapter as well. 
4.1 Examining the IODEF Specification 
In this chapter the IODEF specification document RFC 7970 [31] is thoroughly exam-
ined to see what kind of attributes can be represented with the IODEF data model. The 
goal is to determine whether all the needed attributes for our use case are already pre-
sent in the model or not. If not, it means we need to design an extension to include any 
attributes that are needed but are currently missing from the model. 
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In IODEF, the Incident class is used to represent information relating to a single inci-
dent. The IODEF-Document class can be used to tie these incidents together. Here the 
focus is on the Incident class and what can be represented within it. 
The Incident class itself has some useful attributes, like the purpose attribute, which is 
used to represent the purpose of the incident data report. The possible values of this are 
traceback, mitigation, reporting, watch, and other. Basically, this attribute is used to 
evaluate what needs to be done regarding the incident. Another useful attribute is the 
status attribute. It can have values like new, in-progress, forwarded, resolved, and fu-
ture. The class also has a language identifier attribute and an attribute to indicate disclo-
sure guidelines for the class. 
The disclosure guidelines are represented in the restriction attribute, which is a common 
attribute within the IODEF data model. Each class of the model, even the aggregate 
classes, have a restriction attribute. The default value of this attribute is private, but it 
can have values like public, partner, and need-to-know. This is a useful attribute to see 
who the information should be shared with. 
In addition to attributes, the Incident class also has a wide variety of aggregate classes 
that can be used to represent all kinds of things. Most of the classes are optional, some 
are required, and some can even have multiple instances. In the following, the aggregate 
classes are examined. 
IncidentID Class 
This class is used as an identifier for the incident within the CSIRT, in this case the con-
trol center of the autonomous ship. The incident ID is represented as a string value and 
it must be unique within the CSIRT. The class also has an attribute called name, which 
identifies the CSIRT generating the incident report. This class is something that should 
be in every incident data model, as having an identifier for each incident is extremely 
important. In the IODEF data model, this class is required. 
AlternativeID Class 
This class is used to track IDs that other CSIRTs use for the same incident. This class 
has one or more of the IncidentID class as aggregate classes. This class is optional. Us-
ing this class should be considered when working together with another or multiple 
CSIRTs to solve an incident. 
RelatedActivity Class 
This class is used to relate the incident to previously observed incidents or activity. It 
also allows to attribute the incident to a specific actor or campaign. This class is option-
al, but should be useful for grouping similar incidents together, when information about 
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previous incidents can be useful for incident management purposes, or when the same 
actor is continuously attacking the same target or area.  
The Time Classes 
The Incident class contains several aggregate classes containing information about a 
specific time instant. These are all represented in the Date-Time String format that is 
specified in the RFC. The time classes are: 
• DetectTime: The time the incident was first detected. 
• StartTime: The time the incident started. 
• EndTime: The time the incident ended. 
• RecoveryTime: The time the site recovered from the incident. 
• ReportTime: The time the incident was reported. 
• GenerationTime: The time the contents in this Incident class were generated. 
Out of these, only the GenerationTime class is required by the data model, the rest are 
optional. While these time classes are certainly useful and interesting information, they 
are not indeed required for successful incident management. The GenerationTime class 
is probably the most important from the incident reporting standpoint as well, De-
tectTime following as a close second. 
Description Class 
This class contains a free form description of the incident. This is optional, but certainly 
useful in some cases, especially when the incident report is generated by a human. Au-
tomatically generated incident reports could have something like keywords instead of a 
free form description, to describe the incident. These keywords could include, among 
others, “connection disrupted”, “data compromised”, “systems unavailable”, and so on. 
Discovery Class 
This class describes how an incident was detected. This class has an attribute called 
source that has 20 different possible values that can describe the source of the incident 
detection. These include, among others, intrusion detection systems, third-party moni-
toring, log data, and manual investigation. In addition to this, a free form description of 
how the incident was detected can be given. This class can also have a Contact class as 
aggregate class to specify the contact information of the person or organization that dis-
covered the incident. Another aggregate class is DetectionPattern which describes an 
application-specific configuration that was used to detect the incident in either free form 
or machine-readable form. The information in this class is really important and useful 
for incident management purposes. Of course, this information isn’t always known and 
hence the class is marked as optional. 
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Assessment Class 
This class describes the repercussions of the incident to the victim. Things like system 
impact, monetary impact, time impact, cause, and so on can be described within this 
class. This class can be used to describe either actual or potential outcomes, which is 
specified in the occurrence attribute. All the information in this class is only available 
after an incident is fully dealt with. Hence this class is only useful for incident sharing 
purposes and is marked as an optional class. 
Method Class 
This class describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures used, or the weaknesses ex-
ploited by the attacker in an incident. This class can contain a free form description as 
well as references to the used vulnerability, malware sample, advisory or an attack tech-
nique. The reference is often a Uniform Resource Locator (URL). This class is optional. 
The information contained in this class is often not known when generating the initial 
incident report. This would mean that this class is mostly useful for incident sharing 
purposes. 
Contact Class 
This class allows sharing the contact information of personnel and organizations that are 
involved in the incident management process. For example, names, telephone numbers, 
email addresses, and roles in the incident management can be specified. This is a re-
quired class within the IODEF data model. For our use case this class is not the most 
useful, however, as most of the incident reports are generated automatically by the 
equipment of the autonomous ship. Of course, this could be prefilled with the contact 
information of the person responsible for incident management at the shore control cen-
ter, for example. For cases when incident reports are generated by operators at the con-
trol center this is useful, as well as when working with other CSIRTs. 
EventData Class 
This is a container class to organize data about events that happened during an incident. 
This contains a free form description, different time classes, and other defining infor-
mation for the event. The EventData class is fairly similar to the Incident class but pro-
vides information about a single event inside the incident. There are also some special 
aggregate classes like Flow, Expectation, and Record. The Flow class describes the sys-
tems and networks involved in the event. The Expectation class describes the expected 
action to be performed by the recipient. The Record class contains additional data, for 
example log files, about the incident. The EventData class is recursive, i.e. the Event-
Data class for the second event of the incident is contained as an aggregate class in the 
first events EventData class, third in the second and so on. This class is marked as op-
tional but could be useful for incident reporting in some cases. 
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IndicatorData Class 
This class describes indicators and metadata associated with them. This is how indica-
tors are described in RFC 7970: “An indicator consists of observable features and phe-
nomenon that aid in the forensic or proactive detection of malicious activity and associ-
ated metadata.” [31]. The IndicatorData class can contain multiple Indicator classes. 
Each indicator is specified by an ID. They also include a free form description and 
many other useful attributes. The IndicatorData class is optional and the information 
contained is mostly useful for incident sharing and preventing and discovering further 
incidents. This is not something that would be used for incident reporting. 
History Class 
This class contains descriptions of the significant actions performed by the involved 
parties when managing the incident. The descriptions are free form, so the level of detail 
is left up to the involved parties. This class is optional and clearly only for incident shar-
ing purposes, rather than for initial incident reporting. 
AdditionalData Class 
This class contains any extension classes that are used within the Incident class. This 
class is of course optional. This can be useful if any extensions are needed for the spe-
cific use case that IODEF is applied to. 
After thoroughly examining the IODEF data model specification, it seems clear that all 
the information needed for conventional incident data reporting is representable within 
the model. Important things like incident ID, incident report time, contact information, 
incident description, and ways to add log and other files are present in the data model. 
Quite a lot of information specific to incident sharing can also be represented with the 
model. All of this is optional data, so it won’t be there as a distraction when using this 
model for incident reporting purposes and can be added later if the incident is going to 
be shared outside the organization. 
The use case of reporting incidents onboard an autonomous ship is certainly not the 
most conventional one, and some important information is currently left out of the mod-
el. The model does not consider the mobility of the target in any way. Since an autono-
mous ship is a moving target, positional information at the time of the incident is proba-
bly just as important as the time information itself. Identifying the vessel that is sending 
the incident report would also be a good idea. An extension is needed to add this kind of 
information to the model. 
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4.2 Extensions Design 
An extension to the data model is needed to convey data about the vessel and the voy-
age. First, we need to identify all the information that needs to be included in the exten-
sion. In this case, this information includes: 
• Vessel identification 
• Voyage information 
• Coordinates 
• Speed 
All this information can be provided by the AIS onboard the ship. AIS is used to moni-
tor the movement of vessels and to control maritime traffic and it is mandatory on most 
vessels doing international voyages [42]. 
The IMO number of the vessel can be used for vessel identification, this is a number 
that is given to each vessel when built. This number is known for each vessel and hence 
easy to obtain for the data model. AIS also provides other useful identifying traits of the 
vessel, such as name and type. AIS includes voyage related information, such as desti-
nation and estimated time of arrival (ETA). Positional coordinates are given as degrees 
minutes seconds at up to 0.0001-minute accuracy for both latitude and longitude. These 
can be quite easily converted to decimal degrees for ease of use in the data model. 
Speed is given in knots with 0.1 accuracy. [43] 
RFC 6684 [33] is a guideline document to designing extensions for IODEF provided by 
the MILE working group. The information in this document is used while designing this 
extension. This extension design is just a rough draft and will not be using the Internet-
Draft template provided in the RFC. This extension is only for hypothetical use within 
this thesis but could quite easily be turned into a real extension for IODEF later. 
What is needed for this extension is a completely new class containing the information 
that is listed earlier. This can be achieved by adding a new aggregate class for the Addi-
tionalData class that is an aggregate class of the Incident class. Let’s call this new class 
Shipping. A representation of this class is in Figure 7. 
+----------------+ 
| Shipping       | 
+----------------+ 
| REAL latitude  |<>----------[ VesselID ] 
| REAL longitude |<>--{0..1}--[ Voyage ] 
| REAL speed     | 
+----------------+ 
 
Figure 7.  A representation of the Shipping class. 
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The aggregate classes of the Shipping class are: 
• VesselID: Required. The IMO number assigned to this vessel. Also contains 
other information about the vessel. 
• Voyage: Optional. Information about the voyage that the ship is on. 
The attributes of the Shipping class are: 
• latitude: Optional. REAL. The latitude portion of the coordinates of the vessel in 
decimal degree format.  
• longitude: Optional. REAL. The longitude portion of the coordinates of the ves-
sel in decimal degree format.  
• speed: Optional. REAL. The current speed of the vessel in knots. 
The coordinates and speed are requested at the time provided in the GenerationTime 
aggregate class of the Incident class. This way the information is timestamped and use-
ful. 
The VesselID class contains the IMO number, name, and type of the vessel. More iden-
tifying traits like color, size, etc. could be added to this class later on. These traits are, 
however, not available in the AIS so they would need to be manually configured to the 
model.  A representation of this class is in Figure 8. The VesselID class has no aggre-
gate classes. 
+--------------+ 
| VesselID     | 
+--------------+ 
| STRING       | 
|              | 
| STRING name  | 
| INTEGER type | 
+--------------+ 
 
Figure 8.  A representation of  the VesselID class. 
The content of this class is the IMO number of the vessel in STRING format. This in-
formation is required. IMO numbers consist of the letters “IMO” followed by seven 
numbers. 
The attributes of the VesselID class are: 
• name: Optional. STRING. The name of the vessel. 
• type: Optional. INTEGER. The type of the vessel signified as a number in the 
AIS. List of type numbers can be found at the marine traffic website [44]. 
The Voyage class contains the destination and ETA of the vessel. A representation of 
this class is in Figure 9. The Voyage class has no aggregate classes. 
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+--------------------+ 
| Voyage             | 
+--------------------+ 
| STRING destination | 
| DATETIME eta       | 
+--------------------+ 
 
Figure 9.  A representation of the Voyage class. 
The attributes of the Voyage class are: 
• destination: Optional. STRING. The name of the destination port or city of the 
vessel. 
• eta: Optional. DATETIME. The estimated time of arrival of the vessel. 
The Shipping class is required for every incident report that has anything to do with a 
vessel. This extension class will be tested in the example use cases in Chapter 5. 
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5. USE SCENARIOS AND APPLICABILITY 
In this chapter, the IODEF data model is applied to couple example use scenarios. No 
access to full incident reports from the maritime industry was provided, so the example 
incidents introduced in Chapter 2.2.4 are used as example use scenarios. This means 
that the use scenarios are completely fictional, but still scenarios that could easily hap-
pen in real life. The example incidents are from news articles, so the information that 
they provide is scarce, so all the available information in these cases needs to be as-
sumed. 
These applicability tests are needed to see that the model is usable for the needs of au-
tonomous shipping and that the model is flexible enough to be able to work in many 
different situations. Further testing would be needed to validate the use of this model for 
incident reporting on autonomous ships. These tests would include, for example, using 
the data model over a satellite link, inserting real life data into the data model, and test-
ing various transmit methods. Most of these tests are, however, outside the scope of this 
thesis, while some additional tests are conducted in Chapter 6. 
These use scenarios are introduced in the following three subchapters. Each scenario is 
first explained and then the available information is inserted into the data model. Some 
snippets of the data model XML code are given and explained, while the full IODEF-
Documents for each use scenario in XML can be found in the appendices. 
The first use scenario that is introduced in Chapter 5.1 gives a basic example of an inci-
dent report. Many of the most common parts of the XML schema are introduced and 
explained here. These parts of the schema are not explained in further scenarios to avoid 
redundancy. The last two scenarios in Chapters 5.2 and 5.3 bring out some more special 
use cases and introduce some of the less used parts of the XML schema. 
5.1 Use Scenario: VDR Tampering 
The example incident that will be used for this scenario is labeled as “India, 2012” in 
Chapter 2.2.4. In this incident, the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) of a ship was tam-
pered with. To bring this kind of an incident to the autonomous shipping world, let’s say 
that an attacker gains remote access to the VDR of the ship. This can be achieved by 
hacking into the systems of the ship. The goal of this kind of an attack would be to 
change or erase the data of the VDR. 
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When this kind of an attack happens, we might not at first know that the VDR is target-
ed. Rather, we would first notice the breach of the systems of the ship. Let’s say that the 
breach is noticed by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) onboard the ship. After detec-
tion, the systems would collect any available data about the incident and send the very 
first incident report about this incident to the shore control center. Not much is yet 
known about the incident, but here is the data we could assume we have at this point in 
time: 
• Type of incident (systems breach) 
• Detected by IDS 
• IDS log files 
• Time of the breach detection 
• Location and speed of the ship at detection time 
In addition to this data, there are some required fields in the data model that would still 
be empty. Those are incident ID, contact information, information restriction, report 
purpose, report generation time, and vessel ID. For the sake of this example, the data 
points are given values of some kind so that the data can be inserted into the model. All 
the information is put inside the Incident class of IODEF, which is initiated like this: 
<Incident purpose="traceback" status="new" restriction="need-to-know"> 
The attributes of the class tell us the purpose of the incident report, its status, and the 
level of restriction for the information within. The incident ID is given with the Inciden-
tID class: 
<IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">123456</IncidentID> 
The name attribute of the class specifies the incident response team that is responsible 
for this report. The type of the incident is signified in the Description class with the 
keyword “systems breach” as discussed in Chapter 4.1. This can be simply achieved 
like this in the model: 
<Description>systems breach</Description> 
The fact that the incident was detected by the IDS can be signified in the Discovery 
class like this: 
<Discovery source="nidps"></Discovery> 
Here “nidps” is a preset value for the source -attribute, defined in the IODEF specifica-
tions. It means that the discovery source was a network intrusion detection or preven-
tion system. A link to the IDS log file location can also be added to the data model with 
the RecordData class: 
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<RecordData> 
   <Description>IDS log file.</Description> 
   <URL>systems\ids\ids.log</URL> 
</RecordData> 
The full IODEF-Document that was filled using all the aforementioned data can be 
found in Appendix B labeled as Report A. This is an initial incident report, and as such 
it is quite minimal. The report is also sent from the sea over a satellite link, so minimal-
ism is preferred. This is what an initial report will look like in most cases. 
After the initial report, the incident response team at the control center will start work-
ing on resolving the incident. The priority will be blocking the attacker from the sys-
tems of the ship. More data will be collected from the ship. With some time, the team 
will realize that the real target of the attack was the VDR. Further reports about the in-
cident can be grouped under the initial breach report using the RelatedActivity class. 
As the VDR was targeted it could imply that there has been some activity recorded by 
the VDR that the attacker wanted removed or changed, for example unauthorized access 
to the cargo. Another option is that the attacker was just being annoying and wanted to 
delete all the VDR information for no real reason. In any way, the incident should be 
shared with the organization that owns the cargo that the ship was carrying. Here is the 
information that we should share about this incident: 
• Incident description 
• Repercussions of the incident 
• Time of the incident 
• Contact information 
• Ship’s IMO number 
In addition to all this information, the required fields in the data model will also need to 
be filled again. Lots of information that doesn’t belong to the stakeholders is left out of 
this incident report. The specialty of this incident report lies in the fact that repercus-
sions of the incident are given. The repercussions can be conveyed in the data model 
inside the Assessment class: 
<Assessment occurence="actual"> 
   <IncidentCategory>VDR tampering</IncidentCategory> 
   <SystemImpact  
   severity="medium"  
   completion="succeeded" 
   type="takeover-system"> 
      <Description>Ship’s VDR was accessed without permission.</Description> 
   </SystemImpact> 
   <SystemImpact severity="high" type="integrity-data"> 
      <Description>VDR data was possibly altered.</Description> 
   </SystemImpact> 
   <BusinessImpact severity="medium" type="loss-of-integrity"> 
      <Description>Integrity of the VDR data was lost.</Description> 
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   </BusinessImpact> 
   <IntendedImpact severity="medium" type="loss-of-integrity"> 
      <Description> 
         The attacker intended to delete or change data in the VDR, causing 
         loss of integrity. 
      </Description> 
   </IntendedImpact> 
   <Cause> 
      VDR tampering was made possible by a weakness in the network that has 
      since been fixed. 
   </Cause> 
   <Confidence rating="high"></Confidence> 
</Assessment> 
Here the incident is first categorized as VDR tampering inside the IncidentCategory 
class. Then the impact of the incident is looked at from the system and business points 
of view in the SystemImpact and BusinessImpact classes. The intended impact of the 
attack is speculated in the IntendedImpact class. The reason why this incident could 
happen is given in the Cause class. Finally, a confidence rating for all this information is 
given in the Confidence class. The full IODEF-Document of this incident report can be 
found in Appendix B labeled as Report B. 
5.2 Use Scenario: GPS Spoofing 
This use scenario will follow the example incident labeled as “Russia, 2017” in Chapter 
2.2.4. In the incident, an area at the Black Sea was targeted with GPS spoofing, causing 
GPS to have false signals in that area. For this use scenario, a similar situation is as-
sumed. Let’s say that an area in front of Helsinki is targeted with GPS spoofing, causing 
false GPS signals in the area. GPS spoofing can be quite tricky to detect, but in this sce-
nario, just like in the example incident, the spoofed signal “moves” the ships in the area 
to the shore, making it obvious that the signal is wrong. Reports of this would start 
flowing to the port of Helsinki pretty fast. 
In this scenario, the incident report is coming from port authorities to vessels, control 
centers, and organizations working in the area. In the report, the situation is described, 
and a warning is given. This is the information that such an incident report should in-
clude: 
• Description of the situation 
• How the incident was detected 
• Repercussions of the situation 
• Method of attack 
• Discovery time of the incident 
• Contact for additional information 
In addition to this the required fields of the model will also have to be filled. The inci-
dent is shortly described in free form within the Description class. The information on 
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how the incident was discovered is inside the Discovery class. The intended repercus-
sions of the attack are assessed inside the Assessment class: 
<Assessment occurence="actual"> 
   <IncidentCategory>GPS spoofing</IncidentCategory> 
   <IntendedImpact severity="high" type="loss-of-service"> 
      <Description> 
         The attack is intended to make GPS unreliable in the area. 
      </Description> 
   </IntendedImpact> 
   <Confidence rating="high"></Confidence> 
</Assessment> 
The rating attribute inside the Confidence class is given the value “high” here to indi-
cate that the information provided is authoritative. The confidence rating can get values 
low, medium and high, so the confidence level of this report is the highest possible one. 
The method of the attack is specified within the Method class: 
<Method> 
   <Reference> 
      <Description>Link to explain GPS spoofing.</Description> 
      <URL>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoofing_attack#GPS_spoofing</URL> 
   </Reference> 
</Method> 
A link to the Wikipedia article is given by the authorities as a reference for people who 
are not at all familiar with GPS spoofing. Contact information to the port authorities are 
specified within the Contact class: 
<Contact role="creator" type="organization"> 
   <Description> 
      Contact information to the port of Helsinki incident management team. 
   </Description> 
   <Email> 
      <EmailTo>example@csirt.port.helsinki.fi</EmailTo> 
   </Email> 
   <Telephone type="hotline"> 
      <TelephoneNumber>+358407654321</TelephoneNumber> 
   </Telephone> 
</Contact> 
Here an email address and a hotline telephone number are given. Additionally, more 
information about the contact person could easily be conveyed within the model as well 
as a postal address and time zone of the place. These are not necessary in this case. The 
full incident report of this scenario can be found in Appendix C. 
5.3 Use Scenario: Malware 
This use scenario will not follow any example incident and will be completely fictional. 
Let’s say that an autonomous ship is at port and its’ software is being updated. Some-
how some kind of malware gets into the systems of the ship with the software update. 
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For this use scenario it doesn’t really matter what kind of malware it is, and how it end-
ed up in the systems of the ship. 
In this scenario, the malware is quickly detected by the antivirus software of the ship 
and an incident report is generated and sent to the control center. What makes this sce-
nario special, is that the ship is at port and cellular or WiFi connections are available. 
This means that we can send a lot more information than we could if the ship was at sea 
and a satellite connection was used. This extra information is not necessary but can help 
with the incident management. The information that we have right now includes: 
• Type of incident (malware detected) 
• Detected by antivirus software 
• Output file from the antivirus software 
• Detection time 
• Ships location 
• Vessel identifying traits 
• Voyage information 
In addition to this, all the required fields of the data model also need to be filled, as dis-
cussed in the earlier use scenarios. The type of the incident is specified with the key-
word “malware detected” within the Description class. The fact that the incident was 
detected by antivirus software is specified with the value “av” of the source attribute of 
the Discovery class, this is a predetermined value for all antivirus software given in the 
IODEF specification. All of this is really similar to the VDR tampering use scenario in 
Chapter 5.1. 
In this case only malware detection is reported, and the specifics can be found within 
the output file of the antivirus software that can be found in the RecordData class. This 
file should provide answers to questions such as “What was infected?”, “Which mal-
ware is it?”, “What caused the infection?” and many more. Confidence level of the 
malware detection is also displayed here. All this information is of course dependent on 
the antivirus software that is used. 
What this use scenario was mainly designed to show is the use of the Shipping exten-
sion class. We can specify the name, type (type number 60 means passenger vessel) and 
IMO number of the ship in the VesselID class, and the destination and ETA of the next 
voyage in the Voyage class. This is how the extension would look like in this situation: 
<AdditionalData> 
   <Shipping latitude="60.161871" longitude="24.958996" speed="0"> 
      <VesselID name="Test Vessel II" type="60">IMO7654321</VesselID> 
      <Voyage destination="Stockholm" eta="2017-12-16T22:15:00"></Voyage> 
   </Shipping> 
</AdditionalData> 
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Now that we have good connectivity in this use scenario, older similar incidents can be 
linked to the incident report to provide helpful information about how similar incidents 
were handled before. This can be done within the RelatedActivity class: 
<RelatedActivity> 
   <IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">111111</IncidentID> 
   <IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">101010</IncidentID> 
   <Confidence rating="high"></Confidence> 
</RelatedActivity> 
Here it is indicated that incidents with IDs 111111 and 101010 are related to this inci-
dent. Confidence rating “high” is given to indicate that these incidents had the same 
malware and can be used as reference for incident management. If we want to group 
together multiple incidents, for example when getting many detections from antivirus 
software, it can be done by adding multiple Incident classes inside the IODEF-
Document class.  
Other extra data that could be conveyed with the model in this situation while having 
good connectivity could include information about the network and systems of the ship, 
specific information about the malware, information about the antivirus configuration 
that allowed us to detect this malware, and so on. The full IODEF-Document for this 
use scenario can be found in Appendix D. 
45 
6. TESTING AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter has further analysis and testing of the data model so that we can more con-
fidently validate the use of the IODEF data model for the use case of autonomous ship-
ping. Sending XML files with full incident reports over a high latency connection was 
tested in Chapter 6.1 to see if the connection from sea would be real-time enough. Same 
tests were also conducted from a more stable connection to have something to compare 
to.  
The file sizes of IODEF-Documents are usually quite small, but the high latency intro-
duced by having to use a satellite link connection might cause the file transfer to be 
somewhat slow. This problem would, however, happen with any data model as it is 
based on the connection, but this is still worth investigating to validate the usefulness of 
such an incident reporting method. 
In Chapter 6.2 the data model is analyzed based on the research done. The idea is to 
further validate the choice of the IODEF data model through explaining why the model 
is good and analyzing some of the tests and work done with the model. 
6.1 Transport Testing 
The native point-to-point transport protocol of IODEF is RID which is also developed 
by the MILE working group of IETF. However, IODEF is not tied to RID and can work 
with any other transport protocol as well. For simplicity’s sake these transport tests 
were conducted using SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP). 
For these tests a laboratory network was set up at the TUT cyber security lab. The net-
work consisted of 2 connected computers, one simulating the ship and one the shore 
control center. Between these computers was a link simulator that was used to change 
the properties of the connection. As stated earlier, the tests were conducted twice, once 
using a satellite link and once a cellular link. The bandwidth in megabits per second, 
latency in milliseconds, and packet loss ratio used to simulate these connections can be 
seen in Table 3. Here latency means the one-way latency between the computers. 
Table 3. The properties of the used connections. 
 Bandwidth (Mbps) Latency (ms) Packet Loss Ratio 
4G Cellular 50 50 1% 
Satellite 5 250 20% 
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Both connections were first tested with iperf, which is a network bandwidth measure-
ment tool. A 2-minute run of iperf put the bandwidth of the satellite connection to 33.6 
Kbps and the cellular connection to 1.15 Mbps. This means that the cellular connection 
has a bandwidth that is about 34 times bigger than that of the satellite connection. 
Three different XML documents were created for these test transmissions containing 
IODEF-Documents from the test scenarios introduced in Chapter 5. The IODEF-
Documents that were chosen are reports A and B from Chapter 5.1 and the report from 
5.2. The report from 5.3 was not used as it had a similar file size to the one from 5.3. 
The file sizes of each incident report in bytes and their transport times in milliseconds 
can be found in Table 4.  
Table 4. The results of the transport tests. 
Incident  
Report 
File Size 
(bytes) 
Time over 
4G (ms) 
Time over Satellite 
(ms) 
5.1 (A) 1347 348 3294 
5.1 (B) 2831 352 4764 
5.2 1847 351 2758 
 
The transport times shown in the table are calculated from Wireshark capture files that 
were captured during the tests. From the capture files it can also be seen that opening 
the SFTP connection between the computers took under 2 seconds with the cellular 
connection, and considerably longer with the satellite connection. Depending on 
dropped packets, due to high packet loss ratio and higher latency, opening the connec-
tion could take up to 50 seconds with the satellite connection. The best-case scenario 
that was encountered during the tests for opening the SFTP connection over the satellite 
link was still over 11 seconds. 
From the results it can be seen that the cellular network had such a high bandwidth that 
the transport times did not change at all based on the file sizes. On the satellite test, 
however, the transport times did change quite considerably. The Wireshark captures 
showed a lot of dropped packets and retransmissions on the satellite cases due to the 
fairly high 20% packet loss ratio. This caused most of the fluctuation in the results. 
6.2 Analyzing the Data Model 
In Chapter 3.2, some characteristics of a good data model were introduced. Here is how 
the IODEF model + extension fulfil these characteristics: 
• Completeness: After the extension was added to the model, all the necessary da-
ta can now be represented with the model. This characteristic is fulfilled. 
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• Non-redundancy: No redundancies were found while going through the data 
model specification. This characteristic is fulfilled. 
• Enforcement of business rules: Business rules are considered in the model, for 
example incident ID and contact information are required for each report. Using 
the same incident ID for two separate incidents is however possible without 
software that reads and manages the model. This characteristic is only somewhat 
fulfilled. 
• Data reusability: If the application can read IODEF data, the data should be re-
usable. This characteristic is fulfilled. 
• Flexibility: The model is flexible, as most data points in the model are complete-
ly optional. Only the required data for each use scenario can be represented 
which means no unnecessary data. The model is also extensible. This character-
istic is fulfilled. 
• Stability: Some real-life testing of the model would be needed to define the sta-
bility of the model. This characteristic remains to be determined. 
• Elegance: This is quite a subjective metric, but in my opinion the model is quite 
simple and neat. However, someone new to the model might find it somewhat 
too complicated in some respects. This characteristic is only somewhat fulfilled. 
• Communication: The model can be used to share data with various stakeholders 
as long as the stakeholders have software that can read IODEF data. This charac-
teristic is fulfilled. 
It seems that the model fulfils most of the characteristics of a good data model. Some of 
the characteristics are not fully met or are still undetermined. This isn’t a problem, as 
fulfilling most of the points is enough, as stated in Chapter 3.2. 
As stated in Chapter 3.2.1, the IODEF data model uses XML as its native format. XML 
is often seen as a somewhat too complicated and rigid format, that takes too much space 
for the information that it provides. Thankfully work is already undergoing for IODEF 
to use JSON format that is way more compact and can be serialized faster. This is also a 
huge benefit for the model in the autonomous shipping world as compact formats and 
faster serialization are preferred when using the slow and narrow satellite links. 
Chapter 5 provides multiple use scenarios for the data model. These scenarios show that 
the model can be used for many different cases of incident reporting at sea. Based on 
these use scenarios, the data model is applicable for autonomous shipping, but more 
testing with real-life data would be needed to be sure. Unfortunately, no real-life data 
was available for this thesis work, so these tests would have to be conducted at some 
other time. 
The use scenarios also showcase some of the more special features that the IODEF data 
model provides, like incident grouping, incident assessment, and of course the shipping 
specific class that was designed in Chapter 4.2. In addition to these, the model also has a 
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vast amount of other special classes that were not showcased in the use scenarios but 
could easily be useful in some specific incident reporting situations. This is to say that 
the IODEF data model really exceeds many of the other data models out there with its 
attention to detail and provision of data points for special use cases. 
Another characteristic of the model we should take a look at is the file size of generated 
reports. As seen earlier, the file sizes of the reports used in the transport tests are be-
tween 1347 and 2831 bytes. The 1347-byte report is a typical first incident report, and 
the 2831-byte file contains a report about an incident sent to stakeholders. Reports that 
are sent from the ship to shore should not get much bigger than this. 
The minimum file size is quite easy to determine, just fill an incident report with only 
the fields that are required by the model and use as short as possible values for these 
fields. Using this method, a file size of 635 bytes was received. This should be around 
the floor value of the file size. The ceiling value is a lot trickier to find, as the model 
includes so many optional fields and the values of these fields can vary in length. Basi-
cally, the file size can be infinite, but in practice an incident report should never get file 
sizes bigger than around 5000 bytes. When the model is being used to share incident 
information with stakeholders the file size can get bigger than that, but that use case is 
not as time sensitive as incident reporting, so it should not be a problem. 
The hypothesis for the transport test conducted in Chapter 6.1 was that the high latency 
introduced by the satellite link will make the transport time considerably longer com-
pared to the cellular network case. This is because SFTP uses Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) which has handshake packets to open the connection, and acknowl-
edgement packets for every received data packet. The additional latency should cause 
the large number of packets to waste extra time.  
The transport test in Chapter 6.1 showed the above hypothesis to be true. The file trans-
fer times got around 10 times longer on average. The biggest problem however, seemed 
to be the connection opening, which took considerably longer on the satellite connection 
than on the cellular one. Based on the Wireshark captures taken during the tests, it 
seems that this was largely due to dropped packets that had to be retransmitted. 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is an unreliable, connectionless, and no acknowledge-
ments alternative to TCP. Testing of any UDP based transport protocol could be useful 
to see if it would be a better transmission protocol to use over a satellite link. This is, 
however, outside the scope of this thesis. 
The transport test showed that the bandwidth of the connection doesn’t really affect the 
transmission of these small XML files, as long as the bandwidth is at a reasonable level. 
Latency and packet loss ratio seem to have much more impact in this case. Based on the 
test it is clear that the reports won’t reach the shore control center in real-time. It is not 
feasible to keep a connection open at all time over a satellite connection, which means 
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that a connection must be initiated every time a report needs to be sent, and that adds to 
the file transport time considerably. Even if the files won’t reach the shore in real time, 
it is safe to assume that they get there fast enough so that incidents can be reacted to in a 
timely manner. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the thesis work is concluded by giving answers to the research questions 
presented in Chapter 1.1. This is done by referencing earlier chapters of the thesis and 
drawing conclusions from the research done there. 
The first research question of the thesis is: “What is the current state of autonomous 
shipping?”. This was investigated in Chapter 2.1 and its subchapters. Based on this re-
search it is safe to say that autonomous shipping is still a new and developing technolo-
gy that will still need a lot of work before its widespread commercial use. It also be-
came apparent that this work is being done right now by many different stakeholders all 
around the world. There are clearly still some minor and even major obstacles to cross, 
but these are being solved. The commercial use of autonomous shipping in some ca-
pacity is expected by the year 2025. 
The second research question of the thesis is: “What is the current state of maritime 
physical and cyber security?”. These areas were being looked at in Chapter 2.2 and its 
subchapters. The maritime industry has long traditions with physical security and safety. 
There are clear and up-to-date guidelines and policies on physical security provided by 
the IMO. All in all, physical security is seen as an important thing in the industry and it 
is clearly in a good state right now. Cyber security is another matter, however. Maritime 
cyber security is a rather new branch of cyber security that has developed as ships are 
fitted with more and more ICT equipment. Cyber concerns were first pretty much disre-
garded by the industry. Nowadays the industry starts to see cyber security as more and 
more important, but full guidelines and policies from the IMO are still missing. The 
industry has come together to develop some basic guidelines for everyone to follow. All 
this means that the state of maritime cyber security is currently quite poor. Many im-
provements are needed, especially before autonomous shipping can become a widely 
used technology. 
The third research question of the thesis is: “What are the common practices in incident 
management and reporting, and what kind of reporting methods are used currently?”. 
These areas were investigated in Chapter 3 and its subchapters. It was established that 
there are clear and commonly applied standards and guidelines for information security 
incident management. These are explained in Chapter 3 and incident reporting, that is a 
part of the incident management life cycle, is looked into more thoroughly in Chapter 
3.1. Incident reporting and sharing methods are, however, not at all standardized and 
many organizations use their own methods that are tailored for the organization’s needs. 
Recently, as the machine-readability of incident reports and the sharing of incidents 
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over organization boundaries has become more important, some more standardized and 
commonly used methods have arisen. These include IODEF, STIX and VERIS that are 
introduced in Chapter 3.3. 
The fourth research question of the thesis is: “What kind of a cyber security incident 
data reporting model would be the best for autonomous ships?”. Answers to this ques-
tion were searched in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Out of the incident reporting data models 
introduced in Chapter 3.3 IODEF was chosen as the best fit for this use case. This was 
because IODEF is flexible, extensible, has the right design philosophy, and has a near 
standard status. It also seemed like the most suitable one out of the three after the initial 
look into the models. 
The IODEF specification was looked into more closely in Chapter 4.1 and an extension 
to the data model was designed in Chapter 4.2 to include some use case specific infor-
mation that was not representable with the base model. After this addition it seems that 
the model would be able to represent all the needed information to report cyber security 
incidents from an autonomous ship to the shore control center. 
The data model was then applied to different use scenarios in Chapter 5 to see if the 
model is applicable to this use case or not. The model was used to report incidents from 
an autonomous ship, to share an incident with stakeholders, and to warn ships and or-
ganizations of an ongoing attack in these use scenarios. Based on these use scenarios, 
the model seems applicable to reporting maritime cyber security incidents. It is also 
important to notice that in real-world applications the information would be displayed in 
a graphical user interface, making the information much more readily and easily availa-
ble than trying to find the information from within the XML code. 
A transport test was conducted for XML files containing IODEF-Documents in Chapter 
6. This test showed that while the transport to shore can’t be called real-time, it is fast 
enough. The data model’s good characteristics were brought up later in Chapter 6 to 
further validate the use of the data model in the use case of reporting cyber security in-
cidents from an autonomous ship.  
It is important to notice that this thesis does not fully validate the use of this model, as 
such work is not included in the scope of this thesis. The thesis work provides a good 
amount of research into the IODEF data model and shows that the data model is promis-
ing. All this work will be useful later when more testing is conducted. This testing will 
include trying different transport methods and implementing the data model in laborato-
ry conditions. 
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APPENDIX A: A LIST OF POSSIBLY VULNERABLE EQUIPMENT 
IN THE SYSTEMS OF A SHIP 
This list is mostly taken from “The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships” [17] 
but is modified to only include equipment that would be on an autonomous ship. This 
means that equipment that is concerned with crew or passengers is removed from the 
list. 
Communication systems  
• integrated communication systems  
• satellite communication equipment  
• wireless networks (WLANs)  
• public address and general alarm systems  
Bridge systems  
• integrated navigation system  
• positioning systems (GPS, etc.)  
• Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS)  
• Dynamic Positioning (DP) systems  
• systems that interface with electronic navigation systems and propul-
sion/maneuvering systems  
• Automatic Identification System (AIS)  
• Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)  
• radar equipment  
• Voyage Data Recorders (VDRs)  
• other monitoring and data collection systems 
Propulsion and machinery management and power control systems  
• engine governor  
• power management  
• integrated control system  
• alarm system  
• emergency response system 
Access control systems  
• surveillance systems such as CCTV network  
• Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS)  
• Shipboard Security Alarm Systems (SSAS)  
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Cargo management systems  
• Cargo Control Room (CCR) and its equipment  
• level indication system  
• valve remote control system  
• ballast water systems 
• water ingress alarm system 
Core infrastructure systems  
• security gateways  
• routers  
• switches  
• firewalls  
• Virtual Private Network(s) (VPN)  
• Virtual LAN(s) (VLAN)  
• intrusion prevention systems  
• security event logging systems 
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APPENDIX B: THE FULL IODEF-DOCUMENTS FOR THE USE 
SCENARIO IN CHAPTER 5.1 
Report A: 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- Initial incident report --> 
<IODEF-Document  
version="2.00"  
xml:lang="en"  
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"  
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-
registry/schema/iodef-2.0.xsd"> 
   <Incident purpose="traceback" status="new" restriction="need-to-know"> 
      <IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">123456</IncidentID> 
      <DetectTime>2017-11-08T07:11:42</DetectTime> 
      <GenerationTime>2017-11-08T07:12:16</GenerationTime> 
      <Description>systems breach</Description> 
      <Discovery source="nidps"></Discovery> 
      <Contact role="creator" type="organization"> 
         <Description> 
            Contact information to the organization’s CSIRT. 
         </Description> 
         <Email> 
       <EmailTo>example@csirt.autonomousshipping.com</EmailTo> 
    </Email> 
         <Telephone type="hotline"> 
            <TelephoneNumber>+358401234567</TelephoneNumber> 
         </Telephone> 
      </Contact> 
      <EventData> 
         <Record> 
            <RecordData> 
               <Description>IDS log file.</Description> 
               <URL>systems\ids\ids.log</URL> 
            </RecordData> 
         </Record> 
      </EventData> 
      <AdditionalData> 
         <Shipping latitude="59.654041" longitude="19.846802" speed="23.7"> 
            <VesselID>IMO1234567</VesselID> 
         </Shipping> 
      </AdditionalData> 
   </Incident> 
</IODEF-Document> 
 
 
Report B: 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- Sharing the incident with stakeholders --> 
<IODEF-Document  
version="2.00"  
xml:lang="en"  
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"  
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xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-
registry/schema/iodef-2.0.xsd"> 
   <Incident purpose="reporting" status="resolved" restriction="partner"> 
      <IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">123456</IncidentID> 
      <DetectTime>2017-11-08T07:11:42</DetectTime> 
      <GenerationTime>2017-12-04T15:11:47</GenerationTime> 
      <Description> 
         The ship’s voyage data recorder was accessed maliciously by an  
         unknown attacker. Some data in the VDR might have been changed. This 
         would indicate that something has happened to the ship at some point  
         that the attacker wants to conceal. Please check your cargo for any  
         anomalies when it arrives. Feel free to contact our incident  
         management team with any questions you might have. Contact  
         information is provided in this incident report. 
      </Description> 
      <Assessment occurence="actual"> 
         <IncidentCategory>VDR tampering</IncidentCategory> 
         <SystemImpact  
         severity="medium"  
         completion="succeeded"  
         type="takeover-system"> 
            <Description> 
               Ship’s VDR was accessed without permission. 
            </Description> 
         </SystemImpact> 
         <SystemImpact severity="high" type="integrity-data"> 
            <Description>VDR data was possibly altered.</Description> 
         </SystemImpact> 
         <BusinessImpact severity="medium" type="loss-of-integrity"> 
            <Description>Integrity of the VDR data was lost.</Description> 
         </BusinessImpact> 
         <IntendedImpact severity="medium" type="loss-of-integrity"> 
            <Description> 
               The attacker intended to delete or change data in the VDR, 
               causing loss of integrity. 
            </Description> 
         </IntendedImpact> 
         <Cause> 
            VDR tampering was made possible by a weakness in the network, 
            that has since been fixed. 
         </Cause> 
         <Confidence rating="high"></Confidence> 
      </Assessment> 
      <Contact role="reporter" type="organization"> 
         <Description> 
            Contact information to the organization’s CSIRT. 
         </Description> 
         <Email> 
       <EmailTo>example@csirt.autonomousshipping.com</EmailTo> 
    </Email> 
         <Telephone type="hotline"> 
            <TelephoneNumber>+358401234567</TelephoneNumber> 
         </Telephone> 
      </Contact> 
      <Contact role="admin" type="person"> 
         <ContactName>Ezekiel Example</ContactName> 
         <Description> 
            Contact information to the organization’s administrator. 
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         </Description> 
         <Email> 
       <EmailTo>ezekiel.example@autonomousshipping.com</EmailTo> 
    </Email> 
         <Telephone type="mobile"> 
            <TelephoneNumber>+358407654321</TelephoneNumber> 
         </Telephone> 
      </Contact> 
      <AdditionalData> 
         <Shipping> 
            <VesselID>IMO1234567</VesselID> 
         </Shipping> 
      </AdditionalData> 
   </Incident> 
</IODEF-Document> 
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APPENDIX C: THE FULL IODEF-DOCUMENT FOR THE USE 
SCENARIO IN CHAPTER 5.2 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- GPS spoofing warning report --> 
<IODEF-Document  
version="2.00"  
xml:lang="en"  
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"  
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-
registry/schema/iodef-2.0.xsd"> 
   <Incident purpose="watch" status="new" restriction="public"> 
      <IncidentID name="csirt.port.helsinki.fi">654321</IncidentID> 
      <DetectTime>2017-12-05T11:52:53</DetectTime> 
      <GenerationTime>2017-12-05T12:04:33</GenerationTime> 
      <Description> 
         False GPS signals have been detected at sea in front of Helsinki. 
         GPS spoofing suspected. Be mindful of   this when sailing in the 
         area. This warning has been issued to all vessels and maritime 
         organizations in the area. 
      </Description> 
      <Discovery source="external-notification"> 
         <Description> 
            The incident was reported to port from multiple vessel at the 
            area. 
         </Description> 
      </Discovery> 
      <Assessment occurence="actual"> 
         <IncidentCategory>GPS spoofing</IncidentCategory> 
         <IntendedImpact severity="high" type="loss-of-service"> 
            <Description> 
               The attack is intended to make GPS unreliable in the area. 
            </Description> 
         </IntendedImpact> 
         <Confidence rating="high"></Confidence> 
      </Assessment> 
      <Method> 
         <Reference> 
            <Description>Link to explain GPS spoofing.</Description> 
            <URL> 
               https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoofing_attack#GPS_spoofing 
            </URL> 
         </Reference> 
      </Method> 
      <Contact role="creator" type="organization"> 
         <Description> 
            Contact information to the port of Helsinki incident management 
            team. 
         </Description> 
         <Email> 
       <EmailTo>example@csirt.port.helsinki.fi</EmailTo> 
    </Email> 
         <Telephone type="hotline"> 
            <TelephoneNumber>+358407654321</TelephoneNumber> 
         </Telephone> 
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      </Contact> 
   </Incident> 
</IODEF-Document> 
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APPENDIX D: THE FULL IODEF-DOCUMENT FOR THE USE 
SCENARIO IN CHAPTER 5.3 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- Malware incident report --> 
<IODEF-Document  
version="2.00"  
xml:lang="en"  
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"  
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-
registry/schema/iodef-2.0.xsd"> 
   <Incident purpose="traceback" status="new" restriction="need-to-know"> 
      <IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">123123</IncidentID> 
      <DetectTime>2017-12-15T14:33:12</DetectTime> 
      <GenerationTime>2017-12-15T14:35:55</GenerationTime> 
      <ReportTime>2017-12-15T14:36:03</ReportTime> 
      <Description>malware detected</Description> 
      <Discovery source="av"></Discovery> 
      <RelatedActivity> 
         <IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">111111</IncidentID> 
         <IncidentID name="csirt.autonomousshipping.com">101010</IncidentID> 
         <Confidence rating="high"></Confidence> 
      </RelatedActivity> 
      <Contact role="creator" type="organization"> 
         <Description> 
            Contact information to the organization’s CSIRT. 
         </Description> 
         <Email> 
       <EmailTo>example@csirt.autonomousshipping.com</EmailTo> 
    </Email> 
         <Telephone type="hotline"> 
            <TelephoneNumber>+358401234567</TelephoneNumber> 
         </Telephone> 
      </Contact> 
      <EventData> 
         <Record> 
            <RecordData> 
               <Description>Antivirus software output file.</Description> 
               <URL>systems\av\2017_12_15.log</URL> 
            </RecordData> 
         </Record> 
      </EventData> 
      <AdditionalData> 
         <Shipping latitude="60.161871" longitude="24.958996" speed="0"> 
            <VesselID name="Test Vessel II" type="60">IMO7654321</VesselID> 
            <Voyage  
            destination="Stockholm"  
            eta="2017-12-16T22:15:00"> 
            </Voyage> 
         </Shipping> 
      </AdditionalData> 
   </Incident> 
</IODEF-Document> 
